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THE NEW MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH LAW: PREEMPTION
AND EXPERIMENTATION
EDWARD A. ZELINSKYt
ABSTRACT
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
preempts major features of the new Massachusetts health law.
Although regrettable, this conclusion is mandated by ERISA's
statutory terminology and the controlling case law. Other states, in
fashioning their health care policies, are looking at elements of the
new Massachusetts law. Just as ERISA preempts the individual and
business contribution mandates of the Massachusetts statute, ERISA
will preempt any similar provisions adopted by other states.
Because state experimentation with health care is particularly
desirable today, Congress should, at a minimum, amend ERISA to
validate the new Massachusetts health law. More comprehensively,
Congress should amend ERISA Section 514 to permit all states to
experiment with health care reform insofar as such experiments
relate to employer-provided health care. Ideally, Congress should
repeal section 514 and thus abolish altogether the jurisprudence of
ERISA preemption.
* Edward A. Zelinsky is the Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law at the
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University.
For comments on earlier drafts of this Article, Professor Zelinsky thanks Professors
Eric D. Chason, Jonathan Barry Forman, John H. Langbein, and Paul M. Secunda;
Attorneys Alvin D. Lurie and Chantel Sheaks; and the participants in the Yale Law School
faculty seminar.
This Article is dedicated to the memory of Judge Seymour F. Simon of the Illinois
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many states have, to use Justice Brandeis's
celebrated metaphor,' acted as laboratories of experiment in the
area of health care. Among the recent experiments, two have
attracted particular attention: Maryland's Fair Share Health Care
Fund Act, commonly known as the "Wal-Mart" Act,2 and the new
Massachusetts health law.3 Acting as a severe impediment to this
experimentation is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) 4-in particular, ERISA's preemption clause,
section 514.6
I have recently analyzed the legality of Maryland's Wal-Mart Act
under ERISA and have concluded that ERISA preempts that Act as
a federally forbidden regulation of employer-provided health care.6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
affirming the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, has similarly concluded that Maryland's Wal-Mart Act
is ERISA preempted.7 As a normative matter, this is regrettable
because health care is an area in which states should be permitted,
indeed encouraged, to explore novel approaches. On the merits,
Maryland's Wal-Mart Act is a poorly designed experiment, but the
1. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
2. Fair Share Health Care Fund Act, 2005 Md. Laws 3 (codified as amended at MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-142 (LexisNexis 2007)); MD. CODEANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-
101 to 107 (LexisNexis 2006).
3. 2006 Mass. Acts 58. The original law was subject to a variety of technical
amendments in Chapter No. 324-2006, signed by Governor Romney on October 26, 2006.
4. ERISA was originally enacted in 1974 as Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
ERISA has been repeatedly amended over the years, most recently by the Pension Protection
Act of 2006. ERISA is codified in parts of the Internal Revenue Code (U.S.C. Title 26), and
in Title 29 of the United States Code.
5. ERISA section 514 is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000).
6. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Maryland's "Wal-Mart" Act: Policy and Preemption, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 847 (2006) [hereinafter Zelinksy, Wal-Mart]. An earlier version of this
article appeared as Edward A. Zelinsky, Is Maryland's "Wal-Mart"Act Preempted byERISA?,
41 ST. TAx NOTES 561 (2006).
7. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007), aff'g 435 F. Supp.
2d 481 (D. Md. 2006). The State of Maryland has announced that it will not seek review of
the Fourth Circuit's decision. Karen Setze, Maryland Won't Seek Supreme Court Review of
"Wal-Mart Bill" Ruling, 2007 ST. TAX TODAY 75-15 (Apr. 18, 2007).
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encouragement of experiments includes an acceptance of experi-
ments one thinks will fail.
In substantive terms, the new Massachusetts law is a more
ambitious and admirable experiment than Maryland's Wal-Mart
Act. Nevertheless, as a matter of ERISA preemption, the two
statutes have much in common. In particular, both statutes
impact employer-provided health care in a fashion outlawed by
ERISA section 514(a).' Thus my conclusion: Just as Maryland's
Wal-Mart Act is ERISA preempted, so too major features of the
Massachusetts law are ERISA preempted as forbidden regulations
of employer-provided health care.
This is a regrettable conclusion, but one mandated by the stat-
ute and the controlling case law. ERISA preempts the new law's
mandate requiring covered Massachusetts employers to sponsor
medical plans for their employees and to make "fair and reasonable"
contributions to such plans.9 ERISA also preempts the new law's
requirement that Massachusetts residents maintain "minimum
creditable coverage" for health care, as that requirement effectively
mandates the substantive medical coverage Massachusetts em-
ployers must offer their employees. 10
Other states, in fashioning their health care policies, are looking
at elements of the new Massachusetts law. For example, Governor
Schwarzenegger has proposed that, as part of a package of health
care reforms, California adopt a Massachusetts-style mandate for
businesses to provide medical coverage to their employees as well
as a Massachusetts-type mandate requiring individuals to obtain
medical insurance for themselves." Just as ERISA preempts the
individual and business contribution mandates of the Massachu-
setts law, ERISA will preempt any similar provisions adopted by
California or any other state.
8. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
9. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(a) (2006).
10. See infra Part III.D.
11. Lenny Goldberg, California Governor Proposes 'Fees'for Universal Health Coverage,
2007 ST. TAX TODAY 8-3 (Jan. 10, 2007); Laura Mahoney, California Governor Offers Health
Care Reform Plan, Also Calls for Changes to State Tax Laws, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES
(BNA), Jan. 9, 2007, at H-i; Jennifer Steinhauer, California Plan for Health Care Would
Cover All, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2007, at Al.
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Today, employer-provided medical coverage is central to health
care in the United States. ERISA section 514(a) prevents the
states from enacting legislation which "relate[s] to" such employer-
provided coverage.' 2 ERISA section 514 thereby precludes the states
from experimenting with alternative approaches to health care, like
the new Massachusetts health law, that impact employer-provided
health care.
Because state experimentation with health care is particularly
desirable today, Congress should, at a minimum, amend ERISA
section 514 to validate the new Massachusetts health law. On the
merits, Massachusetts has a compelling argument for congressio-
nal protection from ERISA preemption. As a political matter,
Massachusetts is also well positioned to seek such protection, given
the bipartisan flavor of the new Massachusetts health law.
More comprehensively, Congress should amend section 514 to
permit all states to experiment with health care reform insofar
as such experiments relate to employer-provided health care.
Even those inclined to defend ERISA preemption as we know it
should be troubled by section 514's invalidation of key parts of the
Massachusetts health law and, by extension, similar features of
laws that other states might enact. We do not know if the new
Massachusetts law and its novel provisions will succeed, but they,
and other similar experiments, should be given the chance.
Ideally, Congress should repeal section 514 and thus abolish
altogether the jurisprudence of ERISA preemption. It would
improve the status quo decisively to amend section 514 to immunize
from ERISA preemption state laws pertaining to employer-provided
health care. However, any such amendment of section 514 will
entail knotty issues as to the scope of the immunity that the
amendment grants. In contrast, abolishing section 514 would
eliminate the definitional and borderline questions attendant to
a more limited statutory carve out, which validates for ERISA
purposes only state laws relating to employer-provided health care.
In the first Part of this Article, I outline the major features of
the new Massachusetts health law: the Massachusetts insurance
"connector," the coverage mandates the new law imposes on
12. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
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individuals and employers, and the new Commonwealth Care
Health Insurance Program to subsidize medical insurance for
low-income families and individuals. In the second Part, I examine
the bipartisan and eclectic nature of the compromises embodied in
the Massachusetts health law. In the third Part, I analyze key
features of the new law under ERISA section 514 and find that
ERISA preempts three of these: the employer mandate requiring
covered employers to offer medical coverage to their employees, the
employer mandate requiring covered employers to make fair and
reasonable contributions for such coverage, and the individual
mandate requiring Massachusetts residents to have individual or
group medical coverage that constitutes minimum creditable
coverage. All of these features regulate employer-provided health
care in ways forbidden by section 514.
In the final Part, I place the new Massachusetts health law in the
context of our national debate about health care. In this Part, I
argue that state experimentation with health care permits each
state's regulation to adapt to local conditions and preferences
while generating information and alternatives which can be
emulated, adapted, or rejected by other states. Consequently I urge,
as a minimum, that Congress amend section 514 to permit the
Massachusetts experiment to go forward. Even more desirable
would be the amendment of section 514 to permit all states to
experiment with the regulation of employer-provided health care.
Most desirable would be the total repeal of ERISA section 514.
Given the centrality of employer-provided medical coverage to
health care in the United States today, ERISA preemption effec-
tively prevents the states from experimenting in the health care
arena by blocking state legislation relating to employer-provided
health care. Section 514 should be amended-or, ideally, abolished
altogether-so that, in this arena, the states can pursue their roles
as laboratories of experimentation.
234 [Vol. 49:229
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I. KEY FEATURES OF THE NEW MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH LAW
A. The Connector
Central to the health care structure implemented by the new
Massachusetts law is the state's "health insurance connector,"1 3 a
publicly-governed 4 authority 15 which will perform six major
functions.
First, the connector will facilitate the purchase of health
insurance by "eligible individuals"'6 and "eligible small groups."17
An "eligible individual" is a Massachusetts resident other than a
resident "offered subsidized health insurance by an employer with
more than 50 employees."'" An "eligible small group" is either a
business firm that employs fifty or fewer employees or a "labor
union, educational, professional, civic, trade, church, not-for-profit,
or social organization."'9 The connector will identify those "health
benefit plans"2° which deserve the connector's "seal of approval"1 by
meeting "certain standards regarding quality and value."22 As to
these approved plans, the connector will collect premium payments
from eligible individuals and small groups purchasing their health
insurance through the connector and will remit these premiums to
the insurers.23
Second, the connector will define the criteria that health plans
must satisfy to constitute minimum creditable coverage24 for
13. The connector is established in and governed by new chapter 176Q of the
Massachusetts General Laws. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176Q (2007). Chapter 176Q was added
to the General Laws by section 101 of 2006 Mass. Acts 58. See id.
14. Id. § 2. The connector authority is governed by a board consisting of appointees of the
governor of Massachusetts, appointees of the attorney general of Massachusetts, and various
officials of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts who serve ex officio. See id. § 2(b).
15. Id. §§ 1, 2(a).
16. Id. § 1.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. As to the latter groups, the term "small" is a misnomer because there is no
statutory limit on the number of members such a group may have. See id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See id. §§ 6, 7.
24. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 1(a) (2007).
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purposes of the new law's insurance mandate on Massachusetts
residents. 2 As I discuss infra, the new law imposes upon
Massachusetts residents the requirement that they must be
covered by a satisfactory health care plan. The connector, by
defining the standards for minimum creditable coverage, will
determine which individual and group health plans satisfy an
individual's legal obligation to be covered by mandatory health care.
Third, the connector will administer the Commonwealth Care
Health Insurance Program26 established by the Massachusetts
law.2" As I discuss infra, this program will enable certain low-
income Massachusetts residents to purchase health insurance
through the connector on a subsidized basis.
Fourth, the connector will certify if an uninsured Massachusetts
resident attempts to purchase creditable coverage from among the
approved insurance policies available through the connector, but
cannot obtain coverage that the connector views as "affordable" for
such resident.28 An individual who receives such certification will,
by virtue of his unsuccessful attempt to find affordable insurance
through the connector, be deemed to have satisfied his obligation to
carry health coverage.29
Fifth, the connector will promulgate the rules and regulations
for the "cafeteria" plans which, under the new law, each covered
employer must maintain for its employees to permit such employees
to reduce their currently taxable compensation and thereby pay on
a pre-tax basis insurance premiums and, possibly, co-payments and
deductibles.3 0
25. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176Q, § 3(a)(5) (2007).
26. Id. § 7.
27. The "[c]ommonwealth care health insurance program" is established by Chapter 118H
of the Massachusetts General Laws. MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 176Q § 1 (2007). Chapter 118H was
added by section 45 of the Massachusetts law.
28. Id. § 3(a)(5).
29. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 2(b)(iii) (2007). This section was added to the
Massachusetts General Laws by section 12 of the Massachusetts statute. Section 13 of the
Massachusetts statute amends section 2(b) effective as of January 1, 2008. See section 147
of the Massachusetts statute. However, section 2(b)(iii) remains identical.
30. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151F, § 2 (2007). I discuss infra the new law's requirement for
such cafeteria plans. See infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the connector is designed to address the problem of
portability,"' that is, the need to provide health care coverage
continuity when employees change jobs. Consider, for example, an
individual who works for a small employer, obtains medical
insurance through his employer's participation in the connector,
and switches jobs to work for another small employer that also
participates in the connector. In this example, the individual need
experience no break in his medical coverage as his new employer
can simply continue the payments to the connector for the same
coverage the individual had at his former workplace. Connector-
based insurance will thus be "portable" within the connector.
The connector is intended to reduce the cost of health insurance
while increasing the coverage available to currently uninsured
individuals.32 The connector effectively pools individuals and small
groups into a state-run consortium for purchasing insurance.33
As an actuarial matter, this pooling is intended to reduce premi-
ums because policies offered through the connector should be
underwritten for the large number of insureds expected to obtain
coverage through the connector, rather than separately for insured
individuals and each small group.34 Thus, an employer turning to
the connector for health insurance coverage for its employees
should not pay a premium based on the small number of such
employees. 35 Rather, the insurer offering a policy through the
connector should price that policy based on the total number of
insureds the insurer expects in the aggregate from all connector
participants.36
In effect, the connector is designed to function as a buying
cooperative with lower premiums anticipated from the purchasing
31. Nina Owcharenko & Robert E. Moffit, The Massachusetts Health Plan: Lessons for
the States, BACKGROUNDER No. 1953 (Heritage Found., Washington, DC), July 18, 2006, at
4-5, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/healthcare/bg1953.cfm.
32. See id. at 6-7. An earlier version of the connector was initially proposed for the
District of Columbia. See Lawrence H. Mirel & Edmund F. Haislmaier, Doing It Right: The
District of Columbia Health Insurance Market Reform (April 6,2006), in HERITAGELECTURES
No. 936 (Heritage Found., Washington, DC), May 15, 2006, at 2-4, available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/ healthcare/h936.cfm.
33. See Mirel & Haislmaier, supra note 32, at 2.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
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power which results from combining many individuals and smaller
employers into a single, state-run insurance pool.
Although the connector acts as a pooling device, it is also
intended to create and maintain a competitive market among the
insurers offering coverage through the connector.3 7 When an
individual--or a small group-turns to the connector to purchase
health care coverage, he will select from among one or more of the
policies approved by the connector.38 The result, connector advo-
cates anticipate, will be a robust market operated through the
connector as insurers compete for business by offering competing
policies to the connector's participants.39 The original model for the
Massachusetts connector was denominated an "exchange, 40 as is at
least one subsequent proposal4' building from the Massachusetts
connector. The term "exchange" captures more accurately the vision
of a state-sponsored marketplace for insurance which underpins the
Massachusetts connector.
As to health insurance that employers purchase through the
connector, the design of the connector is intended to permit, for
federal income tax purposes, employees to exclude from their
respective gross incomes the value of employer premiums which the
employers pay to the connector.4 2
37. Owcharenko & Moffit, supra note 31, at 2-3.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 2.
40. See Mirel & Haislmaier, supra note 32, at 10.
41. INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH POLICY SOLUTIONS, COVERING CALIFORNIA'S UNINSURED:
THREE PRACTICAL OPTIONS 34-38 (2006).
42. The IRS has not formally ruled on the excludability from employees' gross incomes
of premiums that employers pay to the connector. However, advocates of the connector model
indicate that they have had "extensive discussions" with the Treasury and are confident that
insurance premiums paid by employers to the connector will be income tax free to the
covered employees. See I.R.C. § 106 (West 1986); Mirel & Haislmaier, supra note 32, at 7;
Robert E. Moffit, The Rationale for a Statewide Health Insurance Exchange, WEB MEMO No.
1230 (Heritage Found., Washington, DC), Oct. 5, 2006, at 1-2, available at http://www.
heritage.orgresearch/healthcare/wm1230.cfm ("In the case of a statewide health insurance
exchange, employers would designate the health insurance exchange itself as their 'plan' for
the purpose of the federal and state tax codes. Thus all defined contributions would be tax
free, just as they would be for conventional employer-based health insurance."). I believe
these advocates are correct. The fact that employer-paid health insurance premiums are
channeled through the state-sponsored connector should not impair the tax-free status of
those premiums to employees.
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The connector is very much a work in progress. Most obviously,
a reasonable time must elapse before we will know whether the
connector has in practice implemented its sponsors' vision of a large
scale marketplace that reduces health insurance premiums and
increases the availability of coverage by pooling eligible individuals
and employers as insurers compete for their business.
B. The Individual Mandate
The individual mandate imposed on Massachusetts residents
is a second major feature of the new Massachusetts law.43 For
these purposes, the concept of Massachusetts residency is
defined broadly." Massachusetts residents with "sincerely held
religious beliefs" against health insurance are excluded from the
law's individual mandate,45 as is any individual whom the connector
certifies as having attempted to obtain connector-approved insu-
rance but who is unable to obtain coverage "deemed affordable by
the connector for said individual."46
All other Massachusetts residents over the age of eighteen must,
as of July 1, 2007, have creditable coverage for health care.4" By
statute, certain types of health care coverage are deemed per se
creditable coverage and thus satisfy the Massachusetts health care
43. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M (2007). Chapter 111M was added to the
Massachusetts General Laws by section 12 of the new law. See id.
44. See id. § 1.
45. Id. § 3. First Amendment mavens will recognize a potential issue here: namely,
whether the religious exemption from the individual mandate is a constitutional
accommodation of the Free Exercise rights of those religiously opposed to insurance or is
instead a narrow subsidization of religion that violates the Establishment Clause. For
background on the constitutional status of tax-based exemptions for religious actors, see
EdwardA. Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits"for Religious Institutions Constitutionally Dependent
on Benefits for Secular Entities?, 42 B.C. L. REv. 805 (2001); Edward A. Zelinsky, Dr. Warren,
the Parsonage Exclusion, and the First Amendment, 95 TAx NOTES 115 (2002), reprinted in
36 TAx EXEMPT ORG. TAx REv. 185 (2002).
46. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176Q 3(a)(5) (2007); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. HIM, §
2(b)(iii) (2007). As noted supra, there are two versions of section 2(b) of chapter 111M. See
supra note 29. Section 2(b)(iii), however, is identical in both versions. See id. For proposed
regulations addressing the criteria for determining affordability, see 956 MASS. CODE REGS.
6.00 (proposed Apr. 12, 2007), available at http://www.mass.gov/Qhic/docs/956%20CMR%
206.00%2OFinal%20060507.pdf. See also Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Agency Proposes
Health Coverage that Most Can Afford, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2007, at A14.
47. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 2(a) (2007).
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mandate for individuals. 48 For example, Medicare and Medicaid
coverage are automatically creditable for purposes of the individual
mandate.49 Similarly, "a medical care program of the Indian Health
Service or of a tribal organization" constitutes creditable coverage
per se.5" If a Massachusetts resident is not covered by one of the
statutorily identified forms of health care, he must obtain coverage
from "an individual or group health plan which meets the definition
of 'minimum creditable coverage' as established by the ... connec-
tor. 51
The connector has proposed regulations delineating the stan-
dards for minimum creditable coverage.52 Under the proposed
regulations, starting on January 1, 2009, a health plan will satisfy
the standards for minimum creditable coverage only if, inter alia,
the plan both "provide[s] a broad range of medical benefits, in-
cluding but not limited to, preventive and primary care, emergency
services, hospitalization, ambulatory patient services, prescription
drugs, and mental health services," and complies with a variety of
limits on deductibles and co-insurance. 3
Each Massachusetts resident will be required on his state income
tax return54 to indicate whether he had the creditable coverage
required by statute, whether he claims religious exemption from the
law's individual mandate,5 or whether he has been certified as
having unsuccessfully attempted to obtain affordable connector-
48. See id. § 1.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See 956 MAss. CODE REGS. 5.00 (proposed Apr. 12, 2007), available at http://www.
mass.gov/Qhic/docs/956%20CMR%205.00%2OFinal%20060507.pdf.
53. Id. at 5.03(2).
54. This use of the Massachusetts resident income tax return demonstrates the utility
of the tax system as an efficient, pre-existing system for communications between the
government and the public. Massachusetts could have created a new, separate system for
Massachusetts residents to report their compliance with the individual mandate of the new
health law. It is more efficient, however, for Massachusetts to use the already existing
income tax system instead. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The
Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REv. 973 (1986). Other proposals would have
other states emulate Massachusetts' use of its tax system to enforce individual mandates.
See, e.g., George C. Halvorson, Francis J. Crosson & Steve Zatkin, A Proposal to Cover the
Uninsured in California, 26 HEALTH AFF. W80 (2007), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/
content/abstract/26/1/W80.
55. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. l1lM, § 3 (2007).
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based coverage.5" If a Massachusetts resident who is legally
obligated to carry creditable health coverage does not do so, he will
be subject to a financial penalty.57 For the period from July 1
through December 31, 2007, the penalty will equal the incremental
state income tax increase resulting from the disallowance of the
uninsured resident's personal exemption.5" Starting on January 1,
2008, the penalty for failure to carry mandated health insurance
will be assessed monthly up to "50 per cent of the minimum
insurance premium for creditable coverage" during such month.59
All penalties assessed will go to the Commonwealth Care Trust
Fund"° which, as discussed below, finances the new Commonwealth
Care Health Insurance Program.6 '
C. The Employer Mandates
A third major feature of the structure established by the new
Massachusetts health law consists of the employer mandates
imposed by that law. Every Massachusetts employer with more
than ten employees must maintain a cafeteria plan.62 To the general
public, perhaps the best known version of a cafeteria plan consists
of so-called flexible spending accounts (FSA)."3 Under section 125
of the Internal Revenue Code, employees who participate in
employer-established cafeteria plans may elect to exclude from their
respective gross incomes the portion of their compensation used to
pay for certain income tax-free fringe benefits.6 4 These elective tax-
56. Id. § 2(b).
57. Id.
58. Id. § 2(b) (as added by section 12 of the new Massachusetts statute).
59. Id. § 2(b) (as added by sections 13 and 147 of the new Massachusetts statute).
60. Id. § 2(c).
61. See infra Part I.D.
62. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151F, § 2 (2007) (as added by section 48 of the new
Massachusetts statute).
63. For background on FSAs, see Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution
Paradigm, 114 YALE L. J. 451, 489-90 (2004) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Defined Contribution];
Edward A. Zelinsky, Defined Contribution Plans After Enron: Exploring a Paradigm Shift,
in N.Y.U. REV. OF EMP. BENEFITS & EXECUTrVE COMP. §§ 1.01, 1.0214] (Alvin D. Lurie ed.,
July 2004) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Paradigm Shift].
64. I.R.C. § 125 (2000).
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free fringe benefits may include qualifying medical costs like
premiums, co-payments and deductibles.65
Under the new Massachusetts health law, employers' statuto-
rily mandated cafeteria plans must be filed with the connector
and must satisfy "rules and regulations" established by the
connector.6" The regulations promulgated by the connector provide
that Massachusetts employers' cafeteria plans must enable their
employees to elect to reduce their taxable compensation to defray
on a pre-tax basis the premiums such employees are required to pay
under their respective employers' medical plans. 7 Employers'
cafeteria plans may also permit participating employees to defray
on a tax-free basis any co-payments and deductibles such employees
must pay.68
In addition, every employer that "employs 11 or more full-time
equivalent employees" in Massachusetts 69 must make "a fair and
65. I.R.C. § 125(f) (2000).
66. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151F, § 2 (2007).
67. 956 MASs. CODEREGS. 4.00 (2007). In particular, see 956 MASS. CODEREGS. 4.07(3)(a)
(2007) ("A Section 125 Cafeteria Plan must, at a minimum, be a premium only plan offering
access to one or more medical care coverage options in lieu of regular cash compensation.").
Employers that pay the full cost of their employees' medical premiums need not maintain
cafeteria plans. Id. at 4.05(2)(e).
68. The new Massachusetts law imposes a "free rider surcharge" upon any employer if
its employees and their dependents, in any year, use more than $50,000 "in free care
services" financed by Massachusetts. MASS. GEN. LAwS ch. 1186, § 18B (2007). Such
employers can avoid this surcharge, however, if they "arrange for the purchase of health
insurance, including coverage through the connector." See id. § 1 (as amended by section 32
of the new Massachusetts health law); id. § 18B (added by section 44 of the new
Massachusetts health law).
In practice, any employer complying with the statutory mandate to maintain a cafeteria
plan for its employees can thereby avoid the "free rider surcharge" by "arrang[ing]" via the
cafeteria plan for employees to buy connector-based insurance with pre-tax salary reductions.
69. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(b) (2007) (as added to the General Laws by section
47 of the new Massachusetts statute). By design or oversight, the new Massachusetts health
law lacks any requirement that employers under common control be aggregated for purposes
of the new law. Consequently, if the same individual is the sole shareholder of two
corporations, each employing ten employees, neither corporation is subject to the new law's
employer mandates; this is true even though, considered as a single economic unit, these
commonly controlled corporations employ twenty persons and would be subject to the law.
In contrast, under the Internal Revenue Code, businesses under common ownership are
treated as a single entity for pension purposes. See I.R.C. §§ 414(b), 414(c), 414(m)(1),
414(n)(1), 414(o) (2000).
242
THE NEW MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH LAW
reasonable premium contribution"7 to "a group health plan"71 that
the employer must "offer"72 to its employees. An employer that fails
to offer such a plan or that fails to make the required contribution
to such a plan must instead pay a "fair share employer contribu-
tion"73 to the Commonwealth Care Trust Fund.7 4 For these pur-
poses, the Massachusetts law defines the plan a covered employer
must offer by incorporating the definition of "group health plan"
promulgated in section 5000(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code.7"
That definition specifically includes an employer's "self-insured
plan."76 A Massachusetts employer's self-funded plan can thus
satisfy the employer's legal obligations to "offer" medical coverage
to its employees and to make fair and reasonable contributions
toward such coverage.
Under the Massachusetts law, the Massachusetts division of
health care finance and policy defines by regulation the standard of
"a fair and reasonable premium contribution."77 Pursuant to its
regulatory authority, the division has promulgated two alternative
tests for determining whether a Massachusetts employer makes
a fair and reasonable premium contribution for its employees.7"
If at least 25 percent of an employer's full-time employees are
actually enrolled in the employer's health plan, the employer is
deemed to be making a fair and reasonable premium contribution.79
Alternatively, if an employer offers to pay at least 33 percent of the
premium cost for each full-time employee's health coverage, the
employer is deemed to be making a fair and reasonable premium
contribution. 0
For an employer with eleven or more full-time employees that
fails to pay fair and reasonable premium contributions, the director
of the Massachusetts Department of Labor will calculate that
70. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(a) (2007).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. § 188(b).
74. Id. § 188(d).
75. See id. § 188(a).
76. I.R.C. § 5000(b)(1) (2000).
77. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(a) (2007).
78. See 114.5 MASS. CODE REGS. 16.03(1) (2007).
79. Id. at 16.03(1)(a).
80. Id. at 16.03(1)(b).
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employer's respective portion of the Bay State's costs for its
"Uncompensated Care Pool, which reimburses hospitals and
community health centers (CHCs) for care provided to lower-income
uninsured and underinsured people."'" As a penalty for failing to
satisfy the statutory mandate to make "fair and reasonable"
contributions for its employees' medical coverage, the employer
must pay to the Commonwealth Care Trust Fund an amount equal
to this cost for uncompensated medical care.8 2 Under no circum-
stances, however, can an employer's annual fair share contribution
to the Commonwealth Care Trust Fund exceed $295 per employee.83
D. The Commonwealth Care Health Insurance Program
The Commonwealth Care Trust Fund finances a fourth major
element of the structure created by the new Massachusetts law: the
Commonwealth Care Health Insurance Program. 4 This program
will enable low-income Massachusetts residents not receiving
health care through other government programs"8 to purchase
subsidized coverage through the connector. For these purposes, a
Massachusetts resident is eligible to purchase subsidized,
connector-based insurance if he has resided in Massachusetts for at
least six months8 and has an individual or family income no
greater than "300 per cent of the federal poverty level."8 If such a
low-income resident does not have available adequate work-related
medical coverage," he will be able to purchase health insurance
81. John E. McDonough, Brian Rosman, Fawn Phelps & Melissa Shannon, The Third
Wave of Massachusetts Health Care Access Reform, 25 HEALTH AFF. W420, W422 (2006),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/contentlabstract/25/6/W420; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
149, § 188(c) (2007).
82. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(d) (2007).
83. Id. § 188(c)(10).
84. The Massachusetts General Laws establish the Commonwealth Care Health
Insurance Program in chapter 118H. Chapter 118H was added to the general laws by section
45 of the new Massachusetts health law. See id.
85. See id. § 3(a)(3).
86. Id. § 3(a)(2).
87. Id. § 3(a)(1).
88. See id. § 3(a)(4).
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through the connector "under a sliding-scale premium contribution
payment schedule" to be determined by the board of the connector. 89
From the resources of the Commonwealth Care Trust Fund, the
connector will pay "premium contribution payment[s]" to insurers
offering coverage through the connector.9" These payments will
subsidize the health care insurance of eligible low-income individu-
als purchasing such insurance through the sliding-scale premium
contribution schedule established by the connector. If the resources
of the trust fund-i.e., penalty payments from individuals and
employers failing to maintain mandated health coverage--"are
insufficient to meet the projected costs of enrolling new eligible
individuals" in the Commonwealth Care Health Insurance Program,
the program will be closed to new participants. 91
II. THE NEW LAW AS PARTISAN AND IDEOLOGICAL COMPROMISE
Proponents of the new Massachusetts law universally praise
the legislation as cutting across partisan and ideological lines.92
Those claims are justified; enacted by a Democratic legislature and
signed by a Republican governor, the new law eclectically combines
elements from different prescriptions for reforming health care
finance.
Particularly evident is the influence upon the Massachusetts law
of those who believe in strengthening market forces in the provision
of medical insurance.93 The most innovative feature of the new
89. Id. § 2; see also 956 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.00 (proposed Apr. 12, 2007), available at
http://www.mass.gov/Qhic/docs/956%20CMR%203.00%2OFinal%20060507.pdf.
90. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118H, §§ 1, 5.
91. See id. § 5.
92. See, e.g., McDonough et al., supra note 81 (calling the legislation "an unusually
bipartisan and bi-ideological flavor"); Elizabeth A. McGlynn & Jeffrey Wasserman,
Massachusetts Health Reform: Beauty Is In the Eye of the Beholder, 25 HEALTH AFF. W447
(2006), http://content.healthaffairs.org/ cgi/content/abstract25/6/W447 (asserting that the
Massachusetts law embodies "i-partisan solutions"); Nancy C. Turnbull, The Massachusetts
Model: An Artful Balance, 25 HEALTH AFF. W453, W453 (2006), http://content.
healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/abstract/25/6/W453 (arguing that the Massachusetts health law
"transcends political ideology").
93. For two recent statements of this position, see JOHN F. COGAN, R. GLENN HUBBARD
& DANIEL P. KESSLER, HEALTHY, WEALTHY & WISE: FIVE STEPS TO A BETTER HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM 35-38 (2005) (favoring expansion of health savings accounts because "public policy
should, whenever possible, allow individual preferences rather than government mandates
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Massachusetts law-the health care connector-is envisioned as a
large scale marketplace in which individuals and small employers
will purchase insurance in a competitive environment. In this
environment, market forces, reinforced by the large population
expected to be served by the connector, are anticipated to reduce
premiums for and increase the availability of health insurance.
The design of the Commonwealth Care Health Insurance
Program similarly reflects a market-based approach to medical
insurance. This program is the health care analogue of food stamps,
a government subsidy that underwrites the recipient's participation
in the marketplace. Those low-income individuals eligible for the
program will, on a subsidized basis, purchase commercial insurance
via the connector's marketplace. The subsidization of their insur-
ance will take the form of lower prices under the income-based
sliding scale for premiums, a scale to be established by the board of
the connector.
Another interesting, but not widely noted, market-oriented
feature of the connector is the ability of nonemployer groups, such
as churches, labor unions, and fraternal organizations, to obtain
health insurance for their respective members through the connec-
tor.94 For those seeking to de-emphasize the current link between
health care coverage and employment, this feature represents a
return to the status quo ante, before employer-provided health
insurance became as pervasive as it is today. In that earlier world,
or at least a nostalgic reconstruction of that world, individuals as
health insurance consumers could shop for health insurance
from a variety of alternative sources including unions, churches,
and civic organizations sponsoring such insurance. Through the
connector, these nonemployer groups will theoretically be able to
offer their members competitively priced health insurance.
Given the tax benefits associated with employer-provided medical
insurance-employer-paid premiums are excluded from employees'
to determine people's health-insurance arrangements"); SALLY C. PIPES, MIRACLE CURE: How
To SOLVE AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE CRISIS AND WHY CANADA ISN'T THE ANSWER 96 (2004)
('[A] switch to consumer-driven policies will reduce costs, which in turn will allow health care
providers to offer greater quality. The consumer revolution in health will not only bring
benefits to patients. It will benefit employers as well.").
94. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176a, §§ 1, 4 (2006).
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gross incomes 95-- it is unlikely that individuals with the option of
employer-based coverage will instead elect coverage through
nonemployer groups. However, some uninsured Massachusetts
residents without the option of work-based coverage, typically
persons who work for employers with less than the eleven employ-
ees necessary to trigger the employer mandates,9" may find it
more attractive to acquire insurance through these nonemployer
groups, rather than purchasing such coverage from the connector
individually.
No doubt some connector advocates envision the market orienta-
tion of the connector going even further than the statute on its face
suggests. These connector supporters anticipate that some, perhaps
many, of the policies to be offered through the connector will be
what are now known as "consumer driven" health care policies.9"
Among such consumer driven health devices are health savings
accounts (HSAs), IRA-like accounts devoted to medical outlays.9"
An HSA allows the account holder to expend funds under his
control from the HSA for routine medical care while high deductible
insurance covers the HSA holder for large and unexpected medical
events.99 In another variant, consumer driven health devices take
the form of health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs).'00 HRAs
also enable the covered individual to pay for routine medical
expenses through the HRA account, rather than relying on
insurance or other third party payment.' 01 Some supporters of the
Massachusetts connector likely expect that some, perhaps many, of
95. See I.R.C. § 106 (2000) (excluding from employees' gross incomes the value of
employer-provided medical coverage). Individually purchased insurance is effectively
nondeductible for most persons because an individual's medical outlays, including insurance
premiums, can only be deducted to the extent such outlays exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted
gross income. See id. § 213(a). Individual payments through an employer's cafeteria plans,
however, are made with pre-tax dollars. See id. § 125.
96. See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 149, § 188(b) (2006).
97. See, e.g., Moffit, supra note 42, at 2 ("A properly designed health insurance exchange
would function as a single market for all kinds of health insurance plans, including
traditional insurance plans, health maintenance organizations, health savings accounts, and
other new coverage options that might emerge in response to consumer demand.").
98. On HSAs, see Zelinsky, Defined Contribution, supra note 63, at 508-09; Zelinsky,
Paradigm Shift, supra note 63, at § 1.02[8].
99. See Zelinsky, Defined Contribution, supra note 63, at 508.
100. See id. at 506-07; Zelinsky, Paradigm Shift, supra note 63, at § 1.02[7].
101. See Zelinsky, Paradigm Shift, supra note 63, at § 102[7].
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the policies to be offered through the connector will utilize HSAs or
HRAs, thereby driving Massachusetts health care further toward
a market-based orientation.
Offsetting the market-based features of the Massachusetts law
are the mandates that the new law imposes upon individuals and
employers. Among other concerns, these mandates respond to the
problem of adverse selection, 1 2 that is, the concern that under a
purely voluntary insurance system, healthy individuals eschew
such insurance as not worth the cost. The nonparticipation of these
healthy individuals leaves the remaining participants in the insur-
ance pool less fit on average, which in turn elevates premiums.'0 '
Higher premiums then trigger a vicious cycle in which yet more
healthy individuals make a price-stimulated decision to drop
insurance coverage, which further segregates those less robust in
the insurance pool, which further increases premiums, ad infini-
tum.
0 4
The new individual mandate established by the Massachusetts
law combats this cycle of adverse selection by forcing all
Massachusetts residents to obtain medical coverage.' °" This
prevents healthy persons from dropping out of the medical insur-
ance pool. At the same time, the employer mandate guarantees that
many, perhaps most, individuals will receive the legally required
coverage at the workplace.
Although the design of the new Commonwealth Care Health
Insurance Program is market-oriented in critical respects, the
program also represents a significant expansion of public subsidy
to individuals who are ineligible for Massachusetts Medicaid but
have incomes less than three times the poverty level.' °6
102. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN
SOCIAL INSURANCE 16 (1999) (defining adverse selection as "the tendency of those at high risk
to be overrepresented in the insurance pool"); DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS:
GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 36 (2002) (characterizing adverse selection
as "good risks (i.e., healthy individuals) leaving the insurance pool" with "too many bad risks
entering it').
103. See GRAETz & MASHAW, supra note 102, at 16-17.
104. See id.
105. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 2(a) (2007).
106. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 11SH, § 3(a)(1) (2007).
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The compromises embedded in the new Massachusetts law have
left some unimpressed. Critics with a libertarian bent have
attacked the new law as a step toward "a government-run national
health care system."' v At the other end of the spectrum, the
advocates of a Canadian-style single payer system view the market
based features of the new Massachusetts law as moving health care
policy in the wrong direction, though the direction they prefer is an
expanded role for government.1
0 8
Most of those supporting the compromises embedded in the new
Massachusetts law temper their sense of self-congratulation with
the more sober recognition that the successful implementation
of the new law is by no means assured. 09 Most obviously, the
connector is a new and unique device. No one will know if it will
work as intended until there is sufficient experience in its actual
operation. Similarly, nothing like the new law's individual and
employer mandates has ever been tried before. The practical
enforceability of those mandates is very much an open question,"'
as is the financing of the new subsidized health care program. Will
there be enough funds in the Commonwealth Care Trust Fund to
finance significant benefits for low income persons? The new law
107. Patricia Barry, Coverage for All, AARP BULLETIN, July-Aug. 2006, at 8, 9 (quoting
Michael Tanner of the Cato Institute); see also Grace-Marie Turner, Universal Health Care:
Proceed with Caution, GALEN INST., Feb. 5, 2007, http://www.galen.org/statehealth.asp?
docID=1002 ("Gov. Romney had a vision of creating a competitive marketplace for affordable
health insurance.... But the compromises demanded by the heavily Democratic state
legislature are jeopardizing its success.'); Sally C. Pipes, Commentary, Mass Medical Mess,
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2006, at B3.
108. Barry, supra note 107, at 8-9 (citing Dr. David Himmelstein); see also Dr. Michael
Hochman & Dr. Steffie Woolhandler, Op-Ed, Healthy Skepticism, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 28,
2006, at All ("The answer lies in an alternative proposal: single-payer national health
insurance. Australia and Canada already use this approach.").
109. See, e.g., John Holahan & Linda Blumberg, Massachusetts Health Care Reform: A
Look at the Issues, 25 HEALTH AFF. W432, W442 (2006), http://content/healthaffairs.
org/cgi/content/abstract/25/6/W432 ("The Massachusetts health reform plan is potentially of
enormous consequence. If it is implemented successfully...."); John E. McDonough et al.,
supra note 81, at W422-23 (noting the law "will take years to implement and evaluate for its
true impact"); Turnbull, supra note 92, at W456 ("Health reform in Massachusetts is very
much a work in progress.").
110. See, e.g., Todd Wallack & Mark Hollmer, Light Fines May Hamper New Health Law,
BOSTON Bus. J., Nov. 11, 2006 ("Experts say penalties are so slight that relatively few
additional Bay State companies will start offering health insurance. Similarly, thousands of
individuals could refuse to sign up for health insurance, figuring they either can't afford the
premiums or that it's cheaper to pay the fines.").
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reflects an awareness that the law's penalties might in practice
yield inadequate financing because the Commonwealth Care Health
Insurance Program will be closed to new enrollees if the trust fund
financing the program becomes depleted."' The program is thus
not a classic entitlement but rather a first come, first served queue
to which will be extended subsidized health coverage through the
connector as long as the money does not run out.
III. ERISA PREEMPTION AND THE MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH LAW
A. ERISA Preemption: An Overview
A definitive assessment of the new Massachusetts law in terms
of health care policy must await the actual implementation of the
new law. However, the key legal question presented by the new law
can-and should-be confronted now: Did Massachusetts have the
authority to enact its new health law? In significant measure, it did
not. ERISA preempts the new Massachusetts health law insofar as
the Massachusetts law mandates covered employers to offer
medical plans and to make "fair and reasonable" contributions to
such plans. ERISA also preempts the new statute insofar as the
statute effectively requires Massachusetts employers to maintain
"minimum creditable coverage" for health care to discharge their
employees' obligations under the individual mandate. These stat-
utory mandates impact employer-provided health care plans in
ways forbidden by ERISA section 514(a).
The saga of ERISA preemption is a much-told story,"2 which
begins with section 514(a), added to ERISA at the very end of a
protracted legislative process."' With beguiling simplicity, section
ill. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. l18H, § 5 (2007).
112. For my telling of this story see Edward A. Zelinsky, Travelers, Reasoned Textualism,
and the New Jurisprudence of ERISA Preemption, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 807 (1999)
[hereinafter Zelinsky, Reasoned Textualism]. See also LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L.
MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE PENSIONAND WELFARE BENEFITS 189 (2004); JOHN H. LANGBEIN,
SUSAN J. STABILE & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 758 (4th ed.
2006); JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A
POLITICAL HISTORY 281-85 (2004).
113. WOOTEN, supra note 112, at 281.
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514(a)114 states that the provisions of ERISA "shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan" regulated by ERISA." 5 In practice,
determining the contours of section 514(a) has been anything but
simple.
For over a decade, the U.S. Supreme Court applied section 514(a)
capaciously, interpreting that provision as preempting virtually any
state law touching upon an employee benefit plan. The Court first
articulated this broad understanding of ERISA section 514(a) and
its preemptive effect in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc."' In Shaw, the
Court held that ERISA section 514(a) invalidated New York state
statutes requiring employers to pay pregnancy-related disability
benefits on the grounds that such statutes had "a connection with
or reference to" ERISA regulated plans, that is, employers' pro-
grams of paying disability benefits to their employees." 7
ERISA also embodies an expansive concept of what constitutes
an employee benefit plan. Specifically, ERISA defines an "employee
welfare benefit plan" as "any plan, fund, or program which ... was
established or is maintained for the purpose of providing ....
through the purchase of insurance or otherwise," enumerated fringe
benefits including "medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits."" "
This combination-the broad Shaw standard for ERISA preemp-
tion (a state law is preempted if the law has a connection with or
reference to an ERISA regulated plan) along with the low threshold
for finding an employee benefit plan to exist for ERISA pur-
poses-led the Supreme Court to strike under section 514(a) an
array of state laws insofar as such laws touched upon employee
benefit plans." 9
When the expansive Shaw standard proved problematic, the
Supreme Court, in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.120 narrowed its under-
114. ERISA section 514 is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000).
115. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
116. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
117. Id. at 96-97.
118. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000).
119. See Zelinksy, Reasoned Textualism, supra note 112, at 815-27 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S.
at 96-97).
120. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
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standing of ERISA section 514(a) and its "relate to" terminology. 2'
The Court has been unwilling so far to acknowledge fully the
tension between Shaw and Travelers. Even under Travelers, how-
ever, ERISA preemption retains great force in particular contexts.
Specifically, under Travelers, state laws that "mandate[] employee
benefit structures or their administration" are preempted under
section 514(a) as relating to ERISA regulated benefit plans. 22 A
state law need not explicitly mandate employee benefit structures
to run afoul of section 514(a). Rather, Travelers indicates that a
state law is ERISA preempted if that law "produce[s] such acute,
albeit indirect, economic effects ... as to force an ERISA plan to
adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage."'23
ERISA section 514(b)(2)(A) protects from ERISA preemption
certain categories of state laws, including any state law that
"regulates insurance.' 24 ERISA section 514(b)(2)(B), often called
the "deemer clause,"'25 cabins this protection for insurance regula-
tion by precluding a state from deeming an employer-sponsored
benefit plan to be an insurance company and thus subject to state
regulation as such.'26 The deemer clause thereby "exempt[s] self-
funded ERISA plans from state laws that 'regulate insurance." 27
This statutory framework may compel as many as three steps
to determine if a particular state law is ERISA preempted. As a
first step, under section 514(a) a state law is presumptively ERISA
preempted if such law relates to an ERISA regulated plan, such
as employer-provided medical coverage.'28 At the second step,
however, an otherwise preempted state law is saved under section
514(b)(2)(A) if it falls into one of the protected categories, including
insurance regulation.'29 At the third stage, an insurance regulation
otherwise protected from preemption forfeits such protection if the
121. See id. at 655-56.
122. Id. at 658.
123. Id. at 668.
124. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000).
125. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Holiday, 498 U.S. 52, 56 (1990).
126. See ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2000).
127. FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 61.
128. See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
129. See id. § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000).
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regulation also governs self-funded employer plans that eschew
insurance. 130
The upshot of this complex legal structure is adverse for the new
Massachusetts health law because key features of the new law
relate to employer plans in violation of section 514(a).' 3 ' The new
law's employer mandates, requiring covered employers to offer
medical coverage to their employees and to make fair and reason-
able contributions for such coverage, 1 2 relate to employers' ERISA
regulated medical plans in ways forbidden by ERISA. Similarly, the
new law's individual mandate, via its concept of minimum credit-
able coverage, 133 relates to employers' ERISA regulated medical
plans by effectively requiring these plans to constitute such
minimum coverage to discharge employees' obligations under the
individual mandate.
13 4
B. The Employer Contribution Mandate
Consider first the new law's requirement that every employer
that "employs 11 or more full-time equivalent employees" in
Massachusetts 135 must make "a fair and reasonable premium
contribution' l to "a group health plan' 37 for its employees. If such
an employer fails to make the required contribution for employee
health care, the employer must instead pay yearly a "fair share
employer contribution ' 13 to the Commonwealth Care Trust Fund139
up to $295 per employee. 14 Under both Shaw and Travelers, this
statutory mandate is ERISA preempted.
130. See FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 52; see also ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B) (2000).
131. See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
132. See supra Part I.C.
133. See supra Part I.B.
134. As noted infra, ERISA does not preempt the new law's requirement that covered
employers maintain cafeteria plans for their employees. See infra Part III.C.
135. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 149, § 188(b) (2007) (as added by Section 47 of the new
Massachusetts statute).
136. Id. § 188(a).
137. Id.
138. Id. § 188(b).
139. Id. § 188(d).
140. Id. § 188(c)(10).
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Under the expansive Shaw reading of section 514(a) and its
"relate to" clause, this statutory mandate is ERISA preempted
because the mandate both refers to and has a connection with
employers' ERISA regulated plans for providing medical care.'
4
'
Instructive in this regard are an early case in the Shaw line,
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 14 as well as the
last of Shaw's progeny, District of Columbia v. Greater Washington
Board of Trade.'43
In Metropolitan Life, insurers challenged as ERISA preempted a
Massachusetts statute that requires health insurance policies
sold in Massachusetts to encompass prescribed mental health
benefits including hospital coverage for mental illnesses and
outpatient services for such illnesses. 144 In Metropolitan Life, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that, per Shaw, the Massachusetts
statute relates to employers' medical plans under section 514(a)
because the Massachusetts statute "bears indirectly but substan-
tially on all insured benefit plans, for it requires them to purchase
the mental-health benefits specified in the statute when they
purchase a certain kind of common insurance policy.' 14' However,
the Court continued, the Massachusetts statute regulates only
insurance contracts and does not reach self-funded employer plans,
which eschew such insurance by financing employees' medical
benefits out of employers' general funds.146 Hence, at the second
step of the analysis under section 514(b), the mental health
mandate statute survives ERISA preemption as a regulation of
insurance. 1
47
In two respects, the new Massachusetts health law is different
from the Massachusetts statute at issue in Metropolitan Life. Both
differences indicate that the new law, unlike Massachusetts's
earlier mental health statute, is ERISA preempted. First, the new
Massachusetts law constitutes direct regulation of employers' plans,
not indirect oversight of such plans via the insurance policies such
141. See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
142. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
143. 506 U.S. 125 (1992).
144. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 729-31.
145. Id. at 739.
146. Id. at 739-47.
147. See id.
[Vol. 49:229254
THE NEW MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH LAW
plans may purchase. The new Massachusetts statute requires all
covered employers to offer health plans and to make fair and
reasonable premium contributions to such plans.14 If, under
Metropolitan Life, the regulation of policies that employer plans
may or may not purchase relates to such plans, a fortiori the new
law's direct and explicit regulation of employers' plans and the
contributions to them also relates to such plans and thus runs afoul
of section 514(a) and ERISA preemption.
Second, the Massachusetts health law explicitly applies to em-
ployers' contributions to self-funded health plans. 149 In Metropolitan
Life, the state statute mandating mental health benefits was
saved from ERISA preemption because, at the second step under
section 514(b), that statute only applied to insurance contracts and
thus constituted permitted insurance regulation under section
514(b)(2)(A). 15 ° In contrast, the new Massachusetts health law
mandates fair and reasonable premium contributions to employers'
self-funded plans,'' as well as to plans which use insurance. Under
section 514, the new mandate's coverage of employers' self-funded
arrangements disqualifies the Massachusetts law as insurance
regulation, leaving the law ERISA preempted under section 514(a).
Specifically, the new statute's requirement of fair and reasonable
premium contributions applies to each covered employer's group
health plan as defined by section 5000(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue
Code.'52 That code section, in turn, incorporates within its definition
of a group health plan any "self-insured plan."' 3 Consequently, a
Massachusetts employer with eleven or more full-time employees
that purchases no health insurance for its employees and instead
fully finances health benefits from the employer's general funds
must satisfy the new statute's requirement of fair and reasonable
148. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(a) (2007).
149. See id.
150. See Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 739-47.
151. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(a) (2007). Although it is technically inelegant to
refer to "premium [s]" paid to self-funded plans, the import of the statute is clear: Employers
that self-fund medical coverage for their employees must make financial contributions for
such coverage the same as do employers that provide medical coverage by purchasing
insurance. See id.
152. See MASS. GEN. LAwS ch. 149, § 188(a) (2007).
153. See I.R.C. § 5000(b)(1) (2000).
20071 255
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
premium contributions to that self-funded plan.14 Per the deemer
clause, section 514(b)(2)(B), the applicability of the new mandate to
self-insured plans precludes the protection from ERISA preemption
of section 514(b)." 5
In short, under Metropolitan Life and that decision's application
of the Shaw standard, the Massachusetts statute's employer
mandate-fair and reasonable contributions-regulates employers'
medical plans directly and explicitly. By including self-funded
plans within the ambit of that direct and explicit regulation, the
Massachusetts statute triggers ERISA preemption under section
514(a) without the protection of section 514(b) for state laws limited
to insurance.
A similar conclusion flows from the last of the Shaw-based cases.
In Washington Board of Trade, a District of Columbia statute
required any employer providing medical insurance to its employees
to provide "equivalent" insurance to any injured employee who
"receives or is eligible to receive workers' compensation benefits.""'
Invoking Shaw and its "connection with or reference to" standard," 7
the Court held that the D.C. law "specifically refers to welfare
benefit plans regulated by ERISA," that is, employers' arrange-
ments for employee health care.' 5 ' "[O]n that basis alone," the
Court reasoned, the D.C. workers' compensation statute is ERISA
preempted under Section 514(a) as relating to employers' ERISA
regulated medical plans."'
In Washington Board of Trade, the D.C. statute did not purport
to regulate an employer's ERISA governed medical plan but merely
used such plan as a yardstick, the standard for determining
mandatory medical coverage for injured employees receiving or
eligible to receive workers' compensation. 160 That statutory refer-
ence to employers' ERISA regulated medical plans was enough to
154. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(a) (2007).
155. See ERISA § 514(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2000).
156. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 128(1992) (quoting
D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-307(a-1)(1) (Supp. 1992)).
157. See id. at 130 n.1.
158. Id. at 130.
159. Id.
160. See Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. at 130-31.
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trigger the Shaw standard for ERISA preemption.161 In contrast,
the new Massachusetts health law does not merely refer to employ-
ers' medical plans for their employees but goes further, regulating
the substance of such plans. Specifically, the new Massachusetts
health law mandates that employer-sponsored medical plans must
be offered and must receive from the sponsoring employer fair and
reasonable premium contributions.162 If the mere reference to
employers' medical plans in the D.C. statute was enough to preempt
that statute, a fortiori ERISA section 514(a) also preempts the new
Massachusetts statute which both refers to and regulates the
substance of such plans.6 '
In the context of the Maryland Wal-Mart statute, Maryland's
Attorney General argues, inter alia, that that statute pertains to
employers' contributions, not to employers' plans.6 4 Consequently,
his argument continues, the Maryland statute survives ERISA
preemption because section 514 only invalidates state laws as they
relate to plans, not as such state laws relate to employers' contribu-
tions.16
In important respects, the Massachusetts law is different from
the Maryland Wal-Mart Act. The Massachusetts statute specifies
that a covered employer, one with eleven or more full-time employ-
ees, 166 must offer a group health plan'6 7 as well as make required
contributions to that plan.' The Bay State's statute, like the D.C.
workers' compensation law, thus explicitly describes employers'
ERISA regulated medical plans in a way the Maryland Act does not.
Even if the new Massachusetts law did not explicitly mention
employers' medical plans this way, for the same reasons the
Maryland Attorney General's argument is unavailing as to the Wal-
Mart law, the argument is also unavailing as to the Massachusetts
health statute: Employers' ongoing contributions for their employ-
161. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
162. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(a) (2007).
163. A similar analysis applies to Maryland's 'Wal-Mart" law. See Zelinsky, Wal-Mart,
supra note 6, at 853-54.
164. See id. at 854.
165. See id. at 854 n.34 and accompanying text.
166. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(b) (2007).
167. Id. § 188(a).
168. Id.
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ees' health care necessarily entail the kind of permanent commit-
ment that constitutes an ERISA regulated welfare plan, namely, a
"plan, fund or program"169 to provide medical coverage.' v Conse-
quently, a state's statutory reference to ongoing employer outlays
for health care refers to and connects with employer financed health
care plans regulated by ERISA.
Moreover, if section 514(a) can be avoided by the semantic
expedient of regulating the employers' contributions to plans rather
than the plans themselves, much of the Court's ERISA preemption
case law becomes a sterile exercise in verbiage.' 7 ' For example,
Shaw, under the Attorney General's parsing of ERISA, is easily
avoided by a state legislature that gets the nomenclature right, that
is, frames its statutory mandate in terms of employer contributions
to plans rather than in terms of the plans themselves."12
In short, even if the new Massachusetts health statute were
amended to delete its explicit reference to the group health plans
covered employers must offer, the statutory requirement of fair and
reasonable premium contributions 7 ' for employee medical care
necessarily relates to such plans since, by definition, employer
contributions for medical coverage entail an employer-sponsored
plan, fund, or program 7 4 to receive the required premiums for such
coverage. The upshot under the Shaw approach to section 514(a) is
ERISA preemption of the Massachusetts employer mandate as
relating to employers' ERISA regulated medical plans.
The same conclusion emerges under Travelers: ERISA section
514(a) preempts the employer contribution mandate of the new
Massachusetts health law as unacceptably relating to employers'
medical plans for their employees. Even for those who see a sharp
break between Shaw and Travelers,7 ' ERISA section 514 after
169. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000).
170. See Zelinsky, Wal-Mart, supra note 6, at 855 nn.35-48 and accompanying text.
171. Id. at 854-55.
172. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
173. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(a) (2007).
174. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000).
175. I am not alone in seeing a significant break between Shaw and Travelers. See, e.g.,
FROLIK & MOORE, supra note 112, at 215 ("In 1995, the Supreme Court appeared to signal
a significant retrenchment from the Shaw interpretation of the extent of ERISA
preemption."); LANGBEIN, STABILE & WOLK, supra note 112, at 781 ("Under Travelers, the
Shaw analysis, which resulted in nearly automatic preemption of state law, was
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Travelers retains great preemptive force in particular cases.
Specifically, Travelers indicates that section 514 and its "relate to"
terminology preempt state statutes that "mandated employee
benefit structures or their administration." ' This is precisely what
the new Massachusetts law does-mandate benefit levels by
explicitly and directly requiring employers with eleven or more full
time employees 177 to offer group health plans 178 to which such
employers must make fair and reasonable premium contribu-
tions. 1
79
Instructive in this context, as in the context of the Maryland Wal-
Mart Act,8 ° is the Court's post-Travelers decision in Egelhoff v.
Egelhoff.l' l Egelhoff addressed the status under section 514 of a
Washington state statute which provides that divorce revokes all
beneficiary designations of a former spouse.'82 The Egelhoff Court
held this state statute ERISA preempted insofar as it instructs
ERISA regulated fringe benefit plans to disregard a pre-divorce
beneficiary designation of a now former spouse.8 3 In such cases, the
Court held, the Washington state law "governs" plan administration
by negating existing beneficiary designations on file with the
ERISA regulated plan.'
The new Massachusetts health law similarly governs ERISA
regulated health plans. The new law requires both that covered
employers establish health plans for employees and that covered
employers make fair and reasonable payments to these plans.'85
Just as Washington State cannot regulate the administration of
ERISA regulated plans, Massachusetts cannot require employers
to sponsor plans or to contribute to them. In both cases, state law
would mandate employee benefit structures or their administration
abandoned.").
176. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 658 (1995).
177. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(b) (2007).
178. Id. § 188(a).
179. Id.
180. See Zelinsky, Wal-Mart, supra note 6, at 860-63.
181. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 146-50.
184. Id. at 148.
185. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(a) (2007).
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in violation of Travelers' understanding of ERISA section 514(a) and
its "relate to" standard for preemption.
8 6
Here too there are potential rebuttals available, although these
ultimately prove unpersuasive. Travelers indicates that "general
health care regulation" survives ERISA preemption." 7 Why cannot
the Massachusetts law's employer mandate be characterized as
such general regulation and thereby be immunized from ERISA's
preemptive effect?
The answer is that this argument, if accepted, makes the
category of general state regulation so broad as to render section
514(a) a nullity. The Travelers Court cites two examples of general
health care regulations that survive ERISA preemption: hospital
"[q]uality control and workplace regulation."' 8 Both examples are
compelling: If a hospital patient's care is paid for by an employer
sponsored plan, the same quality protections should extend to that
patient as to his roommate who pays for his own stay.
In contrast, Massachusetts's new law focuses upon covered
employers and orders them to offer'89 ERISA regulated plans to
their employees and to make fair and reasonable contributions to
such plans.19 ° If this statutory mandate-specifically and directly
targeted at covered employers and their medical plans--constitutes
general regulation of health care spared ERISA preemption, it is
hard to envision a law that is preempted under section 514(a) as
unacceptably relating to employer plans.
Egelhoff is instructive in this context. The Washington state
statute revoking pre-divorce beneficiary designations applied across
the board to all nonprobate designations, for example, as to
individually purchased insurance policies and to beneficiary
designations under non-ERISA plans.'91 The Court declined,
however, to spare the Washington statute as a "generally applicable
186. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 658 (1995).
187. See id. at 661.
188. See id.
189. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 149, § 188(a) (2007).
190. Id.
191. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.07.010(1) (1998). The most common employee welfare plans
outside the scope of ERISA are governmental and church plans. See ERISA §§ 4(b)(1)-(2), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1003(b)(I)-(2) (2000).
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lawf' ' 92 because the statute purported to govern "plan administra-
tion."193 If the Washington statute does not surmount ERISA
preemption as a general law, neither does the Massachusetts law,
which governs substantive plan terms by requiring that medical
coverage be offered and be financed by fair and reasonable'94
employer contributions.
A second possible rebuttal would focus upon the relatively small
penalty-an annual maximum of $295 per employee-that an
employer faces under the new Massachusetts law if the employer
does not offer its employees a group health plan or if the employer
contributes to the plan less than a fair and reasonable amount. 95
For some covered employers, paying the penalty will be cheaper
than maintaining the plan. Hence, the argument concludes, the new
law does not mandate benefits within the meaning of Travelers and
thus survives ERISA preemption.
Again, Egelhoff is instructive. The Washington state statute
permits employers to elect out of the statute's coverage and thereby
nullify the revocatory effect of participants' divorces. 196 For the
Egelhoff Court, this option did not save the Washington statute
from ERISA preemption: "The statute is not any less of a regulation
of the terms of ERISA plans simply because there are two ways of
complying with it, '' 99 that is, to treat divorce as revoking prior
beneficiary designations of the now former spouse or to give notice
that the employer elected against the statutory rule.
The employer contribution mandate of the new Massachusetts
law is closely analogous: A covered employer can comply with the
Massachusetts mandate by sponsoring a health plan and making
required contributions to it or can instead pay yearly up to $295 per
employee to the Commonwealth Care Trust Fund. 9 If the alterna-
tive means of complying with the Washington State law does not
save that law from ERISA preemption, neither does the alternative
of paying to the Massachusetts trust fund.
192. Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147-48 (2001).
193. Id. at 148.
194. MASS. GEN. LAwS ch. 149, § 188(a) (2000).
195. See id. § 188(c)(10).
196. See WASH. REV. CODE § 1l.07.010(1)(b) (1998).
197. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 150.
198. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(b)-(d) (2006).
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Yet a third counterargument to my reading of Egelhoff would
focus upon the Supreme Court's earlier post-Travelers decision in
California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Construction, N.A., Inc.9 ' California law requires contractors to
pay prevailing wages on public projects, but permits contractors
working on such projects to pay lower wages to apprentices en-
rolled in state-approved apprenticeship programs. 00 Dillingham
Construction was a contractor on a public project.2"' Its subcontrac-
tor paid lower wages to apprentices in a program that was not state
approved." 2 When sued by the state, Dillingham Construction
argued that California's law, limiting lower wages to apprentices in
state-certified programs, was ERISA preempted because appren-
ticeship programs are ERISA regulated plans.03
In Dillingham, the Court upheld the California law requiring
that prevailing wages be paid to apprentices working on public
projects unless such apprentices participate in state-approved
apprenticeship programs." 4 Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas,
later the author of Egelhoff, stated that California's "prevailing
wage statute alters the incentives, but does not dictate the choices,
facing ERISA plans."2 °5 That is to say, apprenticeship plans in
California can elect to comply with state standards, and thus make
their apprentices eligible for hire on public projects at reduced
wages, or can eschew those standards, and thus require contractors
on public projects to pay their apprentices at prevailing wage rates.
Similarly, the argument would run, Massachusetts employers
can elect to offer medical coverage to their employees and make fair
and reasonable2. 6 contributions towards such coverage or, alterna-
tively, can choose instead to pay the annual "fair share" contribu-
tion to the Commonwealth Care Trust Fund.2"7 If ERISA section
199. 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 321.
202. Id. at 321-22.
203. Id. at 322; see also ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000) (declaring that
"apprenticeship [and] other training programs" are welfare plans under ERISA).
204. Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 334.
205. Id.
206. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(a) (2007).
207. Id. § 188(c)-(d).
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514(a) does not preempt the California prevailing wage statute for
framing the incentives faced by apprenticeship programs, the
argument would conclude, ERISA should similarly not preempt the
Massachusetts employer mandate for framing the incentives
confronted by employers and their medical plans.
This argument is not without force and highlights possible
tension between Dillingham and the Court's later decision in
Egelhoff. Ultimately, however, the distinction Justice Thomas drew
between Egelhoff and Dillingham'°8 suggests that Egelhoff, finding
ERISA preemption, controls as to the Massachusetts health law.
The California prevailing wage statute is a "generally applicable
law[] regulating 'areas where ERISA has nothing to say"'2 °9 and
which has only "incidental effect on ERISA plans."21 In contrast,
the Washington state statute at issue in Egelhoff "governs the
payment of benefits, a central matter of plan administration." ''
Unlike the California statute upheld in Dillingham, the Washing-
ton law .'dictate[s] the choices facing ERISA plans' with respect to
matters of plan administration."212
From this vantage, the Massachusetts law, because it intrudes
upon the design of plan benefits, looks more like the Washington
statute, which intrudes upon plan administration and is accordingly
preempted by ERISA and section 514(a). In contrast, the California
prevailing wage statute does not regulate the terms of apprentice-
ship plans but merely specifies the wages contractors must pay on
public projects, depending upon the nature of their apprentices'
training. The impact of the prevailing wage statute upon ERISA
regulated apprenticeship plans is thus plausibly characterized as
indirect or, to use Justice Thomas's term, "incidental."2 '
On the other hand, the Massachusetts statute, like the
Washington law, "governs the payment of benefits"2"4 as the
Massachusetts act specifies that covered employers must offer
208. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
209. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147-48 (2001).
210. Id.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 150 (quoting Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 334 (1997)).
213. Id. at 148.
214. Id. at 147-48.
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medical coverage to their employees and must make fair and
reasonable contributions for such coverage.215 The Massachusetts
law prescribes the choices confronting medical plans relative to plan
benefits and thus intrudes deeply and directly into the structure
and operation of such plans. By comparison, the California prevail-
ing wage statute does not stipulate the terms of state-approved
apprenticeship programs, but merely defines the wages that can be
paid to apprentices on public projects.
In the final analysis, both Justice Thomas and his colleagues who
joined his Dillingham and Egelhoff opinions concluded that the
California prevailing wage law and the Washington beneficiary
revocation statute are different for ERISA preemption purposes.216
The Massachusetts health law resembles the latter more than the
former because that law impacts directly and intrusively upon
covered employers' medical plans by mandating the benefits such
plans must provide.
To summarize: whether one views the Court's case law constru-
ing ERISA section 514(a) as a unified body of decisions or, as some
scholars think,21 7 as falling into two distinct strains following either
Shaw or Travelers, section 514(a) and its "relate to" terminology
preempt the new Massachusetts health law's employer contribution
mandate. Both on the face of the law and implicitly, the Massachu-
setts health law refers to and has a connection with employers'
medical plans for their employees. Moreover, the new Massachu-
setts statute mandates plan benefits by requiring covered employ-
ers to offer medical plans for their employees and to contribute fair
and reasonable amounts to such plans.21 ' ERISA section 514(a)
preempts these features of the new law as relating to employers'
medical plans for their employees.
C. The Employer Cafeteria Plan Mandate
On the other hand, ERISA does not preempt the new law's
requirement that employers maintain cafeteria plans qualifying
215. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(a) (2007).
216. See supra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 175.
218. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(a) (2007).
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under Code section 125.219 Such cafeteria plans are not ERISA
regulated welfare plans. Accordingly, Massachusetts's statutory
requirement that covered employers maintain cafeteria plans does
not run afoul of section 514(a); that statutory requirement does not
relate to ERISA regulated plans because cafeteria plans are not
such plans.
Recall in this context ERISA's definition of an employee welfare
plan: "any plan, fund, or program which ... [is] established or is
maintained for the purpose of providing ..., through the purchase of
insurance or otherwise," enumerated fringe benefits including
"medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits."22 Although this
definition is expansive, it is not limitless. A welfare plan regulated
by ERISA is an arrangement for the purpose of providing particular
benefits enumerated in the statute.
In contrast, a cafeteria plan is a compensation device which
permits an employee to elect between current salary or an equiva-
lent payment for an income tax-free fringe benefit. A cafeteria plan
does not itself provide any benefits; rather, the cafeteria plan allows
the participating employee to divert a portion of his current,
otherwise taxable compensation to a plan that does provide such
benefits. Because it is not an actual provider of statutorily enumer-
ated benefits, a cafeteria plan is not an ERISA governed welfare
plan.
The relevant regulations of the Department of Labor (DOL)
confirm this reading of ERISA and the consequent distinction
between a cafeteria plan and an ERISA regulated welfare plan. As
an example, the DOL regulations specify that "a system of payroll
deductions by an employer for deposit in savings accounts owned by
its employees" is not an ERISA governed welfare plan because this
system does not itself "provide benefits." '221 The same analysis
applies to a cafeteria plan under which the employee elects current
salary or, in the alternative, a deduction from salary to pay for a
tax-free fringe benefit such as employer-provided medical care. The
cafeteria arrangement itself does not provide benefits, but merely
219. For a review of Massachusetts's mandatory cafeteria plan, see supra notes 62-68 and
accompanying text.
220. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000).
221. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(a)(2) (2006).
2007] 265
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
diverts employee salary on a tax-favored basis to plans which do
provide such benefits. Because cafeteria plans do not provide
benefits, they are not ERISA regulated "welfare benefit plans."
Consequently, state legislation regulating cafeteria plans does not
relate to ERISA governed plans.
In its only relevant administrative ruling, Opinion 96-12A, the
DOL agreed that a cafeteria plan designed to qualify under Code
section 125 is not an ERISA governed welfare plan.2 22 Under such
a cafeteria plan, the DOL wrote, "employees may receive tax-
favored treatment of [their] contributions" to their employers'
medical plans.223 The cafeteria arrangement, however, is not an
ERISA regulated plan because that arrangement "itself provides
[no] enumerated benefit" listed by ERISA.224
Because, under the statute, regulations, and relevant administra-
tive rulings, cafeteria plans are not ERISA regulated welfare
benefit plans, the portion of the new Massachusetts law that
requires covered employers to maintain such cafeteria plans does
not relate to ERISA governed welfare plans for section 514(a)
purposes. Hence, the cafeteria plan requirement of the Massachu-
setts statute is not ERISA preempted.
The potential rebuttal to this argument would focus upon the
relationship under the new Massachusetts law between the cafe-
teria plans the new law requires and the health care plans that the
law also requires. The Massachusetts law specifies that employers'
cafeteria plans must be filed with the connector and must satisfy
"rules and regulations promulgated by the connector." '225 The
connector's rules and regulations require that employees have the
ability, through their employers' respective cafeteria plans, to pay
medical premiums on a pre-tax basis under Code section 125.226
Thus, the argument would run, each employer's statutorily
compelled cafeteria plan will be an integral part of the employer
provided medical benefit structure imposed by the Massachusetts
law. The statutory requirement to maintain a cafeteria plan that
222. U.S. Dep't of Labor Advisory Opinion 96-12A (July 17, 1996).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151F, § 2 (2007).
226. 956 MASS. CODE REGS. 4.06(3)(a) (2007).
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meets the connector's standards is preempted by ERISA section
514(a) as that requirement is part of the statutorily mandated
structure of medical benefits, itself ERISA preempted.
This rebuttal is not without plausibility. Ultimately, however,
employers' cafeteria plans are better understood as free-standing
arrangements separate from the employers' plans actually provid-
ing medical care, even if such cafeteria plans are required by state
law and are legally obligated to permit pre-tax contributions to
employers' medical plans to defray premiums. As a matter of
federal law, a cafeteria plan is a distinct type of entity, governed by
its own Code provision, section 125.227
The same is true under the Massachusetts statute. If an em-
ployer elects against medical coverage and instead pays the
Commonwealth Care Trust Fund, the new law still obligates the
employer to maintain a cafeteria plan for its employees, even
though that employer maintains no plan for such employees'
medical care.22 Because in such cases cafeteria plans will stand
alone, cafeteria plans maintained by employers that also sponsor
medical plans should be recognized as distinct from such medical
plans.
In the final analysis, the Massachusetts statute, insofar as it
requires covered employers to maintain cafeteria plans for their
employees, does not relate to ERISA governed welfare arrange-
ments because cafeteria plans are not ERISA governed welfare
plans. Rather than actually providing medical benefits, cafeteria
plans merely divert employees' compensation on a pre-tax basis to
plans that do furnish such medical coverage. Accordingly, the
Massachusetts mandate requiring covered employers to sponsor
cafeteria plans is not preempted by section 514(a).
227. I.R.C. § 125 (2000).
228. See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 151F, § 2 (2007). Presumably, in such cases, cafeteria plans
must permit employees to make pre-tax contributions to individual health care policies such
employees obtain from the connector.
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D. The Individual Mandate and the Concept of "Minimum Cred-
itable Coverage"
Consider finally the new Massachusetts mandate for indiv-
iduals.229 Under Shaw, the new statutory mandate on individuals,
via the concept of "minimum creditable coverage," refers to and
connects with employers' medical plans for their employees. Under
Travelers, the Massachusetts statute's standard of minimum
creditable coverage is an indirect but acute regulation of the sub-
stance of employer-provided medical care because Massachusetts
employers offering medical coverage to their employees must in
practice meet the Massachusetts standard to satisfy employees'
respective obligations under the individual mandate. Consequently,
under either interpretation of ERISA section 514(a) and its "relate
to" test for preemption, ERISA preempts the concept of minimum
creditable coverage, which implements the new law's individual
mandate.
Recall the basic structure of the new individual mandate:
Massachusetts residents with certain specified kinds of coverage,
such as Medicaid and Medicare, per se satisfy the statutory man-
date to maintain individual medical coverage.23 ° Massachusetts
residents with sincere religious convictions against medical insur-
ance are excused from compliance with the statutory mandate to
maintain individual coverage.23' Massachusetts residents certified
by the connector as trying but failing to acquire affordable insur-
ance are deemed to have complied with the statutory mandate to
obtain medical coverage.232 All other Massachusetts residents must
have minimum creditable coverage as the connector defines such
coverage. 13 This minimum coverage can be obtained under either
an "individual" or a "group health plan. 234
Most Massachusetts residents satisfying the individual mandate
by means of group health plan coverage will receive such group
229. See supra Part I.B.
230. See MASs. GEN. LAws ch. 111M, §§ 1, 2(a) (2007).
231. Id. §§ 2(b)(ii), 3.
232. See id. § 2(b)(iii).
233. Id. §§ 1, 2(a).
234. See id. § 1.
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coverage from their employers. 235 Hence, under Shaw, the connec-
tor's definition of minimum creditable coverage refers to and
connects with employer-provided medical plans by determining
whether such plans satisfy the statutory minimum and thereby dis-
charge employees' legal obligations under the individual mandate.
In practice, few, if any, Massachusetts employers will maintain
group medical plans that fail the standards for minimum creditable
coverage because, in such cases, employees must purchase largely
duplicative medical coverage on their own to satisfy the new
statute's individual mandate.
Employers must therefore treat the connector's definition of
minimum creditable coverage as an obligatory floor that their
respective health plans must satisfy. Coverage falling below this
floor is of no practical value to the employee who must still
pay for individual coverage to satisfy the individual mandate.
Consequently, under Shaw, the concept of minimum creditable
coverage refers to, and has a connection with, employer-provided
medical coverage regulated by ERISA because, in practice, that
concept establishes a minimum standard that employers must
satisfy to discharge employees' obligations under the individual
mandate.
Instructive for this discussion is the connector's proposed
regulation that employers' health plans, to constitute minimum
creditable coverage, must provide "a broad range of medical
benefits," and must comply with a variety of limits on deductibles
and co-payments.236 These regulations effectively create a floor that
employers' medical arrangements must satisfy to acquit employees
of their legal responsibilities under the individual mandate. Under
Shaw, these regulations relate to employer-sponsored medical plans
because these regulations refer to and have a connection with such
plans.
235. As noted supra, the design of the connector encourages nonemployer groups to obtain
insurance for their members through the connector. See supra Part I.A. The tax benefits
associated with employer-paid medical premiums-excludable from employees' gross
incomes-will, however, lead most individuals to use employer based medical coverage when
it is available to them. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
236. See 956 MASS. CODE REGS. 5.03 (2007).
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Consider again in this context Metropolitan Life237 and the
Massachusetts state law that requires insurance policies sold
within the state to include specified mental health benefits.238
Under Shaw, that mandated benefit law relates to Massachusetts
employers' medical plans because such plans, if they desire to
purchase insurance, must buy insurance providing these required
mental health benefits. In the same way, a Bay State employer that
maintains a medical plan and seeks thereby to discharge its
employees' legal obligations under the individual mandate must
satisfy the connector's standards for minimum creditable coverage.
At the second stage of analysis, the Massachusetts mandated
mental health benefit law survives ERISA preemption as an
insurance regulation. In contrast, the connector's standards for
minimum creditable coverage apply to all group health plans
including self-funded plans that eschew insurance. As we have
seen, this impact upon employers' self-funded plans precludes for
the new Massachusetts health law the insurance exemption from
ERISA preemption.239
In sum, the Shaw approach to ERISA section 514(a), "connection
with or reference to,"2 4 indicates that a key concept of the new
statute's individual mandate-minimum creditable coverage-
unacceptably relates to employers' ERISA regulated medical plans
and is consequently preempted. Minimum creditable coverage is, in
effect, a mandatory floor that Massachusetts employers offering
medical coverage to their employees must satisfy to discharge such
employees' obligations under the new individual mandate. Only by
satisfying that standard can an employer enable his employees to
discharge their legal obligations under the individual mandate.
A similar conclusion emerges under Travelers, which, although
retreating from the capacious approach to ERISA preemption
embraced in Shaw, nevertheless indicates that section 514(a)
retains great preemptive effect in specific cases.241 In particular,
237. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); see also supra notes 144-
47 and accompanying text.
238. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47B (2007).
239. See supra Part III.A.
240. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983).
241. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
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Travelers declares that "a state law might indeed be preempted
under [section] 514" if that state law "produce[s] such acute, albeit
indirect, economic effects, by intent or otherwise, as to force an
ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage. 242
That is the case under the new Massachusetts individual mandate,
which, via the concept of minimum creditable coverage, effectively
forces covered employers to satisfy the statutory minimum for
employee health care benefits to enable employees to discharge the
new law's individual mandate.
Noteworthy in this context is the decision of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit holding that ERISA section 514(a)
preempts Maryland's Wal-Mart law.243 In that decision, the appel-
late court persuasively concluded that Maryland's Wal-Mart Act is
ERISA preempted because, inter alia, the Act leaves Wal-Mart with
no practical alternative but to increase its outlays for medical
coverage to the Maryland Act's minimum standard, 8 percent of
payroll: "In effect, the only rational choice employers have under
the Fair Share Act is to structure their ERISA healthcare benefit
plans so as to meet the minimum spending threshold. 244
The same is true of employers covered by the Massachusetts law:
They have no practical alternative but to comply with the connec-
tor's interpretation of minimum creditable coverage to enable
their employees to satisfy the new Massachusetts mandate for
individuals. Massachusetts residents derive little or no utility from
employer-provided coverage that flunks those standards and thus
fails to discharge the residents' statutory obligation to carry
medical coverage.
In this context, let us revisit the choices presented by the New
York law at issue in Travelers. That law imposed a surcharge for
hospital stays except for those stays paid for by Blue Cross/Blue
Shield coverage.245 By increasing the costs of hospitalizations paid
for by commercial insurance or by employers' self-funded plans, the
242. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross& Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 668 (1995).
243. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007), aff'g 435 F. Supp.
2d 481 (D. Md. 2006).
244. Id. at 193-94.
245. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-C (McKinney 1993); see also Travelers, 514 U.S.
at 649.
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New York law financially incented employers' medical plans to
purchase Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurance rather than obtain
competing commercial insurance or self finance employees' medical
coverage. Under the New York law, however, these alternatives
remained realistic, albeit higher priced, choices. A New York
employer rationally could have decided that the financial savings
from using Blue Cross/Blue Shield coverage-lower rates for
hospital stays-were counterbalanced by compensating benefits
obtainable through competing carriers or self funding, such as
better coverage, faster claims processing, and more flexibility in
determining the contours of coverage.
In contrast, the Massachusetts statute (like Maryland's Wal-
Mart Act) gives the employer maintaining medical coverage for its
employees no realistic alternative to the minimum creditable
coverage standard, as explicated by the connector. If an employer's
medical plan fails that standard, the failing employer's employees
will be required to acquire on their own individual coverage that
meets that standard. Under this statutory scheme, the employer
derives no practical benefit by sponsoring medical coverage that
flunks the test of minimum creditable coverage and thus fails to
discharge the employees' obligations under the new individual
mandate. Employees receiving employer coverage below the
minimum standard established by the connector will be forced by
the individual mandate to purchase their own, largely duplicative
medical coverage.
Hence, the new law's individual mandate "produce[s] ... acute,
albeit indirect, economic effects ... [that] force an ERISA plan to
adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage, 246 specifically, the
requirements for minimum creditable coverage as expounded by the
connector. The practical effect of the individual mandate is thus
distinguishable from the impact of the New York law at issue in
Travelers because the New York law left employers' plans with the
realistic, albeit higher priced, alternatives of commercial insurance
and self funding. In contrast, the new Massachusetts health care
statute leaves an employer sponsoring medical care no realistic
alternative but to comply with the statute's standard of "minimum
246. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668.
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creditable coverage" to discharge employees' obligations under the
individual mandate.
I foresee two possible lines of rebuttal to this analysis. First, it
can plausibly be asserted that the impact of the Massachusetts law
is not as acute as the impact of Maryland's Wal-Mart Act. If Wal-
Mart fails the Act's minimum outlays for medical coverage, 8
percent of payroll, Wal-Mart is required to remit the resulting
deficiency, dollar-for-dollar, to Maryland's Fair Share Health Care
Fund.24 7 This imposes a marginal tax of 100 percent for every dollar
Wal-Mart falls short of the statutory minimum for health care
outlays.24 Confronted with this statutory scheme, District Judge
Motz convincingly observed that when "employers are faced with
the choice of paying a sum of money to the State or offering an
equal sum of money to their employees in the form of health care,
no rational employer would choose to pay the State."'249 Accordingly,
the Maryland Act effectively mandates Wal-Mart's level of health
benefits in violation of ERISA section 514(a).
In contrast, a covered employer can choose under the
Massachusetts law to eschew employer-provided medical plans
and instead pay a "fair share employer contribution"'25 to the
Commonwealth Care Trust Fund.251 It is thus plausible to charac-
terize the Massachusetts law as less coercive than the Maryland
Act because, in some cases, it will be economically rational for
Massachusetts employers to terminate their medical plans and, in
lieu of such plans, pay to the Commonwealth Care Trust Fund the
penalty for noncoverage.
Notwithstanding this possibility, the Massachusetts health law
is still acute in its substantive impact upon employers and their
medical plans. Once a Massachusetts employer decides that, for
competitive reasons or otherwise, the employer must offer medical
coverage to its employees, it makes no economic sense for the
employer to provide less than minimum creditable coverage. This
247. Maryland Fair Share Health Care Fund Act, MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-104
(LexisNexis 2007).
248. Zelinsky, Wal-Mart, supra note 6, at 865.
249. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n. v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 497 (D. Md. 2006).
250. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(b) (2007).
251. See id. § 188(d).
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minimum is effectively a mandated floor for Massachusetts
employers sponsoring medical arrangements for their employees
because, under the individual mandate, employees derive no utility
from employer-provided medical coverage that does not satisfy that
mandate. In the face of employer-financed medical coverage failing
the criteria for minimum creditable coverage, employees must, on
their own, obtain and pay for largely duplicative medical coverage
constituting such minimum creditable coverage.
Moreover, as the Egelhoff Court noted,252 the availability of a
statutorily created alternative-in this case, the employer's fair
share contribution to the Commonwealth Care Trust Fund-does
not save a state statute from ERISA preemption when the statute
dictates the choices. That is precisely what the Massachusetts
statute does: It requires covered employees to either maintain a
medical plan constituting minimum creditable coverage or make the
fair share contribution to the Commonwealth Care Trust Fund.
A second retort would characterize the individual mandate as the
kind of general health law that Travelers spares from ERISA
preemption. At first blush, this characterization possesses a certain
plausibility: Individual and group plan participation constituting
minimum creditable coverage are among several forms of health
care that discharge the Massachusetts mandate for individuals.
Medicaid and Medicare coverage, for example, also satisfy the
individual mandate for Massachusetts residents.25 3
Consequently, the argument runs, the requirement that individ-
ual and group health plans must constitute minimum creditable
coverage to satisfy the individual mandate is part of a general
scheme under which other, specified forms of health care also
satisfy the new statutory mandate imposed upon Massachusetts
residents.
Upon closer examination, however, the new law's approach to
individual and group health plans is not part of a generalized
statutory scheme. Rather, the new law's regulation of individual
and group health plans is both sui generis and highly intrusive,
unlike the law's approach to other forms of creditable coverage
252. See Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 150 (2001).
253. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 1 (2007).
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discharging the new individual mandate. Once the connector
explicates the statutory standards for minimum creditable cover-
age, the new law will effectively impose a substantive floor on
individual and group health plans in the Bay State. In contrast, the
new law makes no effort to prescribe the substantive standards that
other forms of medical coverage must satisfy to constitute creditable
coverage.
For example, the new law makes no effort to define the content
that Medicare must satisfy to constitute creditable coverage.
Medicare is per se deemed adequate coverage for purposes of the
individual mandate.254 The same is true of the other forms of
medical care that the new law automatically recognizes as credit-
able coverage, for example, Medicaid255 and "a medical care program
of the Indian Health Service or of a tribal organization." '256 Under
the new law, these alternatives are all per se deemed creditable
coverage satisfying the individual mandate without the Common-
wealth or the connector assessing or prescribing their substantive
257terms.
In contrast, individual and group health plans constitute
minimum creditable coverage only if they comply with the substan-
tive standards promulgated by the connector. The concept of
minimum creditable coverage is unique to such plans because only
as to them does the connector assess substantive adequacy for
compliance with the individual mandate.
Moreover, the statute's substantive regulation of individual and
group plans is highly intrusive. A Massachusetts employer offering
medical coverage to its employees has no realistic alternative but to
comply with the standards promulgated for minimum creditable
coverage to discharge employees' obligations under the individual
mandate. In contrast, the Massachusetts statute makes no other
effort to influence the substantive standards of coverage used by
Massachusetts residents to discharge the individual mandate.
254. Id.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. See id.
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In sum, the concept of minimum creditable coverage is the kind
of mandated benefit structure that remains ERISA preempted
under Travelers.
E. Summary
Under Shaw, ERISA section 514 preempts the Massachusetts
employer mandate, which requires covered employers to offer
medical plans for their employees and to make fair and reasonable
contributions to such plans. Also under Shaw, section 514 preempts
the Massachusetts individual mandate insofar as that mandate
requires Massachusetts residents to maintain minimum creditable
coverage for medical care. Both the employer and the individual
mandates refer to and connect with Massachusetts employers'
ERISA regulated welfare plans for medical care.
Similar conclusions emerge under Travelers. The employer
mandate is a direct and explicit regulation of the benefits that
Massachusetts employers must offer their employees through
ERISA governed medical plans. The individual mandate's concept
of minimum creditable coverage is an indirect, but acute, regulation
of such plan benefits: A Massachusetts employer's medical plan for
its employees must constitute minimum creditable coverage to
discharge its employees' obligations under the individual mandate.
Accordingly, under Travelers, ERISA section 514(a) preempts both
statutory mandates as unacceptably relating to employers' ERISA
governed plans.
IV. THE CASE FOR EXPERIMENTATION
The new Massachusetts health law, like the Maryland Wal-Mart
Act, was adopted in the context of our ongoing national debate
about the provision and financing of health care. Virtually no one
defends the health care status quo in the United States, although
there is no agreement as to what the problem is. The most fre-
quently quoted statistics, showing that health care outlays in the
United States have grown and continue to grow at a rapid rate,25
258. See, e.g., John Abramson, Editorial, Healthcare Code Blue, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2006,
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by themselves prove nothing. Americans today spend billions on
personal computers that they did not forty years ago, before such
computers existed. No one, however, suggests that the rapid growth
in personal computer expenditures represents a national crisis.
Indeed, most would consider such expenditures a sign of productive
investment.
The pronounced growth of health care outlays is perceived as a
problem only because of the widespread belief that much of the
money is being spent poorly. But there is no consensus as to why
that may be so. Insurers' administrative costs, denounced by some
as unnecessary outlays for unwanted bureaucracy," 9 are justified
by others as funds usefully spent on medical cost control.2"' Monies
devoted to new and experimental treatments can be viewed as
sensible outlays to extend health and life spans or as wasteful
expenditures on unproven, but typically expensive, methodologies.
Many discretionary medical outlays can be cast as unwarranted
frivolity or as manifestations of an affluent society satisfying its
needs. In the same fashion, much late-in-life medical spending can
be characterized as resources devoted by a compassionate society to
its elderly or instead as marginally useful expenditures by a society
that does not have the discipline to say "no."
261
at A29 ("The spiraling cost ofhealthcare is well known: $7,100 per person this year, projected
to increase to $12,000 in 2015 and compounding at more than double the rate of inflation.
Already, medical care gobbles up one-sixth of the GDP.'); David R. Francis, Healthcare Crisis
Countdown, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 6, 2006, at 16 ("The US spends 15 percent of its
gross national product on healthcare, of which 31 percent goes for administrative costs.');
Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Care Spending in the United States and OECD Countries
(2007), http://www.kff.org/insurance/snapshot/chcm010307oth.cfm ("it is reasonably well
known that for some time the United States has spent more per capita on health care than
other countries. What may be less well known is that the United States has had one of the
highest growth rates in per capita health care spending since 1980 among higher income
countries.").
259. Hochman & Woolhandler, supra note 108 ("[Insurance companies spend several
times as much on administrative costs as public programs do."); Leonard Rodberg, The
Unraveling of Private Insurance, http://www.pnhp.org/news/2006/october/the-unraveling_
of.pr.php (Oct. 24, 2006) ("Wasteful. More than 20 percent of our spending on health care in
this country is simply for administering our multipayer, for-profit insurance system.").
260. See, e.g., JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT 150 (2006) (discussing those
economists who conclude "that health insurers need to exercise more vigilant oversight of
patients and medical providers").
261. See, e.g., Eric Cohen & Yuval Levin, Health Care in Three Acts, COMMENTARY, Feb.
2007, at 46-47 (discussing "the dilemmas of end-of-life care in a rapidly aging society" and
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For some critics of American health care, the problem is funda-
mentally one of equity. For these critics, although more is being
spent on medical costs, too many Americans lack access to medical
services. But here also there is no consensus. Whereas some
emphasize the medical vulnerability of the uninsured,262 others see
rational consumers reasonably assessing the costs and benefits of
medical insurance and electing against it.263
For yet others, the problem is that we place medical costs on the
wrong institutions of our society. From this vantage, American
businesses, forced to absorb growing expenses for health care, find
themselves at a competitive disadvantage compared to firms abroad
that do not incur such expenses.264
Underlying this cacophony are three contrasting visions of
medical care. For some, medical care is simply a consumer good
similar to others.265 From this consumer-based perspective, the
principal problem of the status quo is market failure caused by
government intervention that has distorted markets for medical
"the painful decisions that come at the limits of medicine and the end of life").
262. Rodberg, supra note 259 (observing that "the employer-based system [is] leaving
increasing numbers of Americans without health coverage").
263. See, e.g., COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH INSURANCE, STATE HEALTH INSURANCE
INDEX 2006: A 50-STATE COMPARISON OF THE NATION'S HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET (2006)
("Surveys of the uninsured consistently show that the cost of health insurance is the primary
reason for their being uninsured. Thus, the most efficient way to reduce the number of
uninsured Americans is to ensure that people have access to a wide range of affordable
health insurance policies."); see also Cohen & Levin, supra note 261, at 47 (noting that, of the
medically uninsured, a "fifth (many of them young adults, under thirty-five) earn more than
$50,000 a year but choose not to buy coverage"); David Gratzer, First, Do No Harm, FORBES,
Feb. 12, 2007, at 32 ("Many people have done the math and have decided not to get
coverage.").
264. See, e.g., Ron French, Stranglehold. How General Motors and the Nation Are Losing
an Epic Battle to Tame the Health Care Beast, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 26, 2006, at 1A ('eThe
profits of U.S. businesses are being eaten away by rising health care costs-a financial
burden not borne by their competitors based in other countries."); Joe Nocera, Resolving to
Reimagine Health Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2006, at C1 ("As global competition heats up,
and as health care costs continue to rise, it seems to me that more and more companies are
going to feel the same way the auto companies feel right now: placed at a serious
disadvantage as they compete with companies abroad that do not have to offer health care
to their workers, because that's something their government does."); Mark Gottlieb, Great
White North, Jan. 2, 2007, http://www.pnhp.orglnews/2007/january/great-white-north.php
('The average real cost of health care to employers in Canada works out to about one-eighth
that incurred in the United States.").
265. See, e.g., COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 263.
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insurance.266 The current task of public policy is to enable efficient
consumer decision making for medical services. 67 This vision today
finds its most tangible manifestations in HRAs, HSAs, and other
forms of consumer-driven health care, as well as the campaign to
free medical insurance products from what is characterized as
excessive state regulation.2 8
In contrast is the vision of medical care as an entitlement of
citizenship. From this vantage, medical care is a right rather than
a service to be purchased. This vision underpins support for single
payer medical systems under which the government finances
coverage for all its citizens. In the.United States today, the most
visible embodiment of medicine as a right of citizenship is Medicaid,
which provides publicly subsidized medical coverage to qualifying
low-income persons and families.
A third perspective is medical insurance as an employment-
related fringe benefit. In practical terms, most Americans of
working age today receive their medical coverage through their
employers. At one level, the employment-based nature of medical
coverage in the United States is an accident of tax policy: Because
employer-provided medical coverage is excluded from covered
employees' gross incomes, the Internal Revenue Code has, over
time, caused the financing of medical coverage to shift to employers.
Yet others view employers as having a moral obligation to provide
health care coverage to their employees. This assumption underlies
much of the rhetoric supporting Maryland's Wal-Mart Act and
266. See Grace-Marie Turner, Massachusetts Health Plan Is. No Model for Other States,
GALEN INST., Oct. 26, 2006, http://www.galen.org/statehealth.asp?doclD=932 ("[E]xpensive
coverage mandates and regulations ... have made insurance in the private marketplace so
expensive in the first place.").
267. Bill Thomas, Letter to the Editor, Lather Early, and Often, FORBES, Nov. 13, 2006,
at 34 ("[Plut consumers in charge of their health services.").
268. See, e.g., Mark V. Pauly, Is Massachusetts a Model at Last?, AEI ONLINE, Jan. 4,
2007, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25372,filter.all/pubdetail.asp ("The best strat-
egy would cease trying to discover the unknown, and instead place as few restrictions or
obligations as possible on the coverage a person must have."). One proposal reflecting this
perspective is that federal law permit the creation of national "Association Health Plans"
which would transcend particular states' insurance mandates. See, e.g., H.R. 241, 110th
Cong. (1st Seas. 2007).
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similar proposals to force Wal-Mart to spend more for its employees'
health coverage.269
This lack of consensus might be taken to suggest that the states
should do nothing about the perceived problem of medical coverage:
If we cannot agree on a diagnosis, we should not agree on a
solution. This passive approach, however, is neither politically
realistic (there is too much public concern about health care for
elected officials to do nothing) nor correct as a matter of policy. The
most feasible and productive responses to the perceived problems
of health care in the United States will likely be varied, often
untidy, combinations of these three different underlying visions.
Even in the absence of consensus, states can and should proceed
with experiments that combine these competing visions in different
ways, as has Massachusetts.
Although the new Massachusetts health law can be derided as
something for everybody (perhaps not such a bad thing in a demo-
cratic society) it is better characterized as the new law's proponents
view it, as a broad and promising compromise forged from elements
of different perspectives. Elements of this compromise are being
considered in other states. 270 Although Massachusetts, like every
other state, has its own idiosyncrasies, the implementation of the
new Massachusetts law will generate useful information for the
entire nation. Maybe a state sponsored connector/exchange will
work in Massachusetts or maybe it will not. It will be good to know
either way. The same is true of the other features of the new
Massachusetts law.
It is here that the ethos of experimental federalism collides with
the legal reality of ERISA preemption. State experimentation with
269. See, e.g., AFL-CIO, THE WAL-MART TAX: SHIFING HEALTH CARE COSTS TO
TAXPAYERS 1 (2006), available at http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/walmartupload/
walmartreport_031406.pdf ("Wal-Mart is directly contributing to the nation's Medicaid
crisis.").
270. See, e.g., Judith Graham, A New Plan To Insure All: Proposal Would Require
Illinoisans to Get Health Coverage, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 8, 2006, at C1; Richard G. Jones, Health
Insurance for All Is Considered in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, at B5; Aurelio
Rojas, Open to New Health Plans: Aides Say Governor May Ask Employers To Shoulder
Worker Coverage, But Is Seeking Other Ideas, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 3, 2006, at A4; M.
William Salganik, Plan Would Require Health Insurance: State Panel Drafts Proposal To
Insure All Workers, BALT. SUN, Nov. 17, 2006, at 1E; Halvorson et al., supra note 54, at W80-
81.
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health care permits each state's regulation to adapt to local
conditions and preferences. For example, in some states, like
Massachusetts, the uninsured population is relatively small, both
in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total population.
71
In other states, such as California, the uninsured constitute, both
in absolute and relative terms, much larger populations.272 In some
states, there may be a willingness to experiment with single payer
systems, whereas in others, a more libertarian, consumer driven
approach to medical care may predominate. Allowing each state to
experiment with its own approach to health care permits adapta-
tion to these (and other) local conditions and preferences, at the
same time generating information and alternatives that can be
emulated, adapted, or rejected by other states.
Under ERISA section 514(a) and the controlling case law,
however, key features of the Massachusetts law are ERISA
preempted. Unless Congress acts, it is only a matter of time before
the courts, applying section 514(a), Shaw, Travelers, and their
respective progeny, strike the new law's employer contribution
mandates and the new law's concept of "minimum creditable
coverage." Regrettably, this will dismantle key features of the
Massachusetts experiment and will leave other states' potential
experiments stillborn.
The alleged virtue of ERISA preemption is the national unifor-
mity in the provision of employee welfare benefits protected by such
preemption. In the context of the Maryland Wal-Mart statute, I
argued that this virtue, upon analysis, proves elusive.273 The same
is true of the new Massachusetts health law. It is precisely because
Massachusetts has done something different from the other states
that its experiment should be allowed to proceed. Only in this way
can we learn what portions, if any, of the experiment are productive
and thus potentially exportable to other states.
271. Pauly, supra note 268 ("[A] relatively small share of Massachusetts' population is
uninsured when compared with other states.").
272. Jeffrey Krasner, Calif. 's Healthcare Plan Looks Familiar but Revamp Faces Taller
Hurdles than in Mass. Because the Problem Is Much Bigger There, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 11,
2007, at D1 ("[A] staggering 7.2 million Californians lack healthcare coverage--one in five
residents.").
273. See Zelinsky, Wal-Mart, supra note 6, at 874-77.
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Because of the bipartisan provenance of the new Massachusetts
health law, Massachusetts is particularly well positioned to request
that Congress amend section 514 to immunize the Massachusetts
law from ERISA preemption. A model for such an amendment is
ERISA section 514(b)(5), which exempts from ERISA preemption
the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act. Congress can and should
adopt a similar exemption for the new Massachusetts health law.
More fundamentally, Congress should add to section 514(b)'s
existing exemptions from ERISA preemption another exemption for
state health care legislation. Until then, ERISA preemption is a
cloud hanging over state experimentation relative to health care.
This is so even for those who might read section 514(a) and the
ERISA preemption case law as imposing fewer restrictions on the
states than I do. Even if section 514 cuts a narrower swath than I
have suggested, it still inhibits in significant ways states from
legislating as to the provision and financing of health care.
Most comprehensively, Congress should abolish section 514
altogether and thereby avoid the definitional and borderline
problems inherent in a more limited exemption from ERISA
preemption for state health care laws. Such definitional and
borderline problems-for example, when does a state law pertain to
health care?-would be a reasonable price to pay if there were a
compelling case for keeping section 514(a) and thus ERISA
preemption as the residual default rule. But there is no such case." 4
True, ERISA preemption does not preclude states from experi-
menting with insurance regulation or with health care outside the
employment context. However, employer-provided health coverage
is central to the status quo; as long as states cannot experiment as
to employer based medical coverage, states cannot experiment
meaningfully. And ERISA section 514(a), under either the Shaw or
274. Id.
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Travelers rubric,275 stops the states from adopting legislation that
relates to employer-provided medical care.
Consider, for example, a state that enacts a Massachusetts-
style individual mandate sans the other features of the new
Massachusetts health law. In this state, residents would be re-
quired to carry creditable coverage but there would be no connector
or subsidized coverage like the Commmonwealth Care Health
Insurance Program, nor would there be any employer mandates.276
Presumably, individuals would satisfy this statutory mandate, inter
alia, through either individual or employer-provided coverage
meeting specified standards. In this case, the individual mandate
would be ERISA preempted for the same reasons the individual
mandate of the Massachusetts law is preempted. Under Shaw, the
mandate, by defining satisfactory coverage, would refer to and
connect with employers' ERISA governed medical plans. Under
Travelers, the mandate would effectively force employers' plans to
meet those specified benefit standards in order to discharge
employees' obligations under the individual mandate. Conse-
quently, this experiment of a stand-alone individual mandate would
be stillborn by virtue of ERISA section 514(a).
275. A third approach suggested by some members of the Supreme Court is to read section
514(a) as embodying nothing more than the Court's normal preemption jurisprudence,
jurisprudence that starts with a presumption against preemption. In many cases, that
approach produces attractive results because, starting with the Court's standard
presumption against preemption, state laws like the Maryland Wal-Mart Act and the new
Massachusetts health care law survive legal challenge.
Ultimately, however, this interpretation of ERISA section 514(a) is, for several reasons,
unpersuasive. Most importantly, the exemptions of section 514(b) are rendered anomalous
if section 514(a) constitutes nothing more than the Court's normal preemption doctrine.
From what, then, are the state laws exempted by section 514(b) exempted?
Another alternative to Shaw and Travelers would be to read section 514(a) as reversing
the traditional presumption against preemption and as creating a zone of employer autonomy
as to employee welfare plans. I find this the most persuasive of the possible readings of
section 514, although under this reasoned textualist approach, the Maryland Wal-Mart Act
and the new Massachusetts health law would still be preempted as intruding upon the zone
of employee benefit autonomy that ERISA reserves for employers. This leads me to favor the
amendment or repeal of section 514. See Zelinsky, Reasoned Textualism, supra note 112, at
832-34, 836-37, 839-49; Zelinsky, Wal-Mart, supra note 6, at 867-70.
276. Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney vetoed the portion of the new Massachusetts
law establishing the employer mandates, but the legislature overrode his veto.
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Suppose that another state wants to try a single payer system
for its residents' medical costs.27 7 If the state's single payer
legislation affirmatively forbids employer-sponsored medical plans,
ERISA again preempts that legislation. A state single payer statute
explicitly forbidding employers from maintaining ERISA governed
welfare plans would relate to such plans for purposes of section
514(a). Even if state legislation establishing a single payer system
is silent on the subject of employer plans, that legislation would be
ERISA preempted because of its economic effects upon employers'
plans. Payments to the state sponsored system would have the
indirect but acute (and intended) effect of quashing most, if not all,
employer-based medical insurance. Indeed, the advocates of a single
payer system view the termination of employment based medical
coverage as a major advantage of such a system.278 That state
caused termination would itself relate to the employer based plans
being terminated.
Prior to Travelers, it was common to speak of an ERISA created
regulatory gap. ERISA section 514, it was contended, preempted
state laws relative to employee welfare plans, in particular, medical
plans, without ERISA itself providing any substantive supervision
to replace the state laws ERISA preempted. Much of the impetus
for a federal Patients' Bill of Rights stemmed from this ERISA
created regulatory gap and the inference many drew that federal
law needed to fill this gap.27 9
Travelers and its progeny have, in important measure, closed
this regulatory gap. It is, for example, now established that,
notwithstanding section 514, standard medical malpractice claims
are subject to state tort law, even when negligent medical services
are provided through employer financed medical care.28° It is also
277. I am personally skeptical of single payer systems but conclude that, in the interests
of experimentation, it would be useful if one or more states tried such a system.
278. See, e.g., Rodberg, supra note 259.
279. Edward A. Zelinsky, Against a Federal Patients'Bill of Rights, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 443 (2003), reprinted in NYU REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXEcuTIVE
COMPENSATION (Alvin D. Lurie ed., 2003); Edward A. Zelinsky, Against a Federal Patients'
Bill of Rights-The Sequel, in NYU REV. OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION § 1.01, at 1-1 to 1-2 (Alvin D. Lurie ed., 2005) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Sequel].
280. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 236 (2000) ('The mischief of Herdrich's
position would, indeed, go further than mere replication of state malpractice actions with
HMO defendants."); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Pegram and Preemption: Patients'Rights
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now established that states, via their authority to regulate insur-
ance, can supervise HMOs because HMOs pool risk and thereby
function as insurers.2"' These conclusions have closed much28 2 of the
prior regulatory gap and thereby removed the momentum for
federal legislation because the states can, consistent with ERISA,
provide tort remedies for medical malpractice and can legislate
relative to HMOs.
Although Travelers and its offspring have largely closed the
ERISA generated regulatory gap, that gap has not been closed in its
entirety. The new Massachusetts health law and its status under
section 514 evidence the residual regulatory fissure still created by
ERISA preemption. Massachusetts can regulate the insurance
products purchased by employer plans and, to that extent, can
influence those plans indirectly. However, ERISA preempts state
law regulating directly the substance of employers' medical plans.
In particular, section 514 precludes state regulation of those
employers that self fund employee medical care and thereby eschew
insurance products subject to state supervision.
Hence, although the scope of ERISA preemption has receded
significantly from the expansive vision initially expounded in Shaw,
section 514 still blocks much useful experimentation by the states,
such as the new Massachusetts health law, experimentation that
intrudes upon employers' medical arrangements and is thus ERISA
preempted. This suggests that section 514(b) should be amended to
exempt from ERISA preemption state laws relative to health care
or, even better, that section 514 should be abolished altogether.
Because employers that self fund employee medical care are
among the principal beneficiaries today of section 514-section 514
protects such employers from state regulations like the new
Massachusetts health law and the Maryland Wal-Mart Act-such
employers can be expected to resist any effort to repeal or
and the Case for Doing Nothing, 88 TAx NOTES 1053 (2000).
281. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 386-87 (2002) (upholding
Section 4-10 of the Illinois Health Maintenance Organization Act against an ERISA
preemption challenge).
282. Not all of the gap has been closed. See Zelinsky, Sequel, supra note 279, § 1.01, at 1-1
to 1-3 (discussing the ERISA created limitations on remedies under Aetna Health, Inc. v.
Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004), and Great-West Life &Annuity Ins. Co. V. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204
(2002)).
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modify section 514. Most such employers are probably unconcerned
with statutes like the Maryland and Massachusetts laws, which
propound substantive standards most self-funding employers,
particularly large employers, satisfy anyway. Rather, motivating
self-funding employers' defense of section 514 is the specter of
broader, more stringent, and ultimately more expensive state-by-
state regulation down the road.
The lesson of the Massachusetts health law is that a system of
experimental federalism must give the states ample room to explore
different regulatory schemes as they affect employer-provided
health care. With ERISA section 514 amended or repealed, some
states will choose not to regulate. Others will choose regulation
of employer-provided medical care that is quite extensive and
stringent. The premise of experimental federalism is the desirabil-
ity of a plethora of contrasting approaches.
This leads me to oppose proposals to abate ERISA's preemptive
effect by establishing a federal commission to which states can
submit their respective health care statutes for permission to
proceed.2"3 Although well intentioned, such proposals are not well
advised. States should be free to proceed on their own with the
health care experiments they choose. A federal commission with
authority to waive ERISA preemption would instead enmesh the
states in yet another layer of federal regulation.
In sum, it is hard to envision significant state experimentation
with medical coverage that does not run afoul of section 514(a) and
ERISA preemption, given the centrality today of employer-provided
medical coverage to health care in the United States. ERISA
preemption prevents the states from enacting legislation that
relates to such employer-provided coverage. ERISA section 514
consequently prevents the states from experimenting with novel
approaches to health care, like the new Massachusetts health law.
Such experimentation will permit states to adapt to local consider-
ations and preferences, while at the same time providing useful
experience and information for the nation as a whole. Congress,
accordingly, should alter or abolish ERISA preemption, at least as
to health care, to allow Massachusetts and other states to enact
283. See, e.g., The Health Partnership Act, S. 2772, 109th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2006).
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their respective experiments with the provision and financing of
health care.
CONCLUSION
The principal features of the new Massachusetts health law-the
Massachusetts insurance "connector," the mandates the new law
imposes on individuals and employers, and the new Commonwealth
Care Health Insurance Program-reflect a bipartisan and eclectic
set of compromises. Regrettably, ERISA section 514 preempts key
provisions of the new law: the statutory mandate that covered
employers offer medical coverage to their employees and make fair
and reasonable contributions for such coverage, and the statutory
mandate that certain Massachusetts residents must have individ-
ual or group medical coverage that constitutes minimum creditable
coverage. Under ERISA section 514(a), these statutory mandates
unacceptably relate to employer-sponsored medical plans.
Congress should amend section 514 to permit the Massachusetts
experiment to go forward. Ideally, and more comprehensively,
Congress should amend or repeal ERISA section 514 so that other
states may enact their respective experiments in the health care
arena.
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